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EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE:
CHARACTER AND OTHER
EXCLUSIONARY RULES
By KENNETH L. CHAssE*
A.

INTRODUCTION
Circumstantial evidence is real or testimonial evidence which, by means
of inference, i.e., indirectly, aids in the deciding of a disputed issue. In contrast, direct evidence does not depend upon inference to aid in the deciding
of the issue for which it is adduced. It is used directly to establish the proposition which it contains.
This article will attempt to compare the provisions relating to circumstantial evidence recommended by the Law Reform Commission of Canada
in its Report on Evidence1 with the existing law in Canada. Reference will
also be made to the British law and to existing codifications of the law in the
United States. The principal American codification is the U.S. Federal Rules
of Evidence2 which became operative on July 1, 1975. Reference will also
be made to the California Evidence Code3 and to the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, 1953. 4 The Uniform Rules, published by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, have been adopted by a number
of States. The Ontario Law Reform Commission's Draft Evidence Act in the
Report on the Law of Evidence,5 does not address the subject of character
evidence with respect to disposition or the use of certain types of circumstantial evidence to show conduct.
B.
1.

CHARACTER
The Relevancy of CharacterEvidence
Character evidence may be offered for the following reasons: first,

Q Copyright, 1978, Kenneth L. Chasse.
* Special Advisor (Criminal Law Policy), Department of Justice, Ottawa. Editorin-chief, Criminal Reports (new series).
I Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence (Ottawa: Ministry of
Justice, 1975). The Report recommends in its proposed Evidence Code, a group of ten
sections (17 to 26) under the heading, "Exclusion of Certain Circumstantial Evidence."
The sub-headings deal with "Character and Disposition" (sections 17 to 20), "Preventive
Action" (sections 21 to 23), and "Compromises" (sections 24 to 26).
2 Fed. Rules Evid., 28 U.S.C.A., (1975).
8 Cal. Evid. Code (West).
4
Uniform Rules of Evidence (U.L.A.) 1953. The second version of these rules, the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, 1974, are so similar to the Federal Rules that they do not
justify separate comparison, unless one were dealing with the law of privilege.
5 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Law of Evidence (Toronto:
Ministry of the Attorney General, 1976).
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character evidence may be circumstantial evidence of specific acts; second,
character may be in issue; and third, character evidence may be used to impeach or support credibility. This paper will deal only with the first two of
these reasons for adducing evidence.
The commentary in the Law Reform Commission of Canada's Report
on Evidence sets out the Commission's approach to the use of character
evidence to show disposition, and its assessment of the probative value of
such evidence in general, as follows:
Section 17: The use of what is called character evidence is one of the most complicated areas of evidence law. The Code attempts to simplify the matter by distinguishing the inadmissibility of character evidence from the manner of proving it when
admissible, and by distinguishing its admissibility to attack or support the credibility of witnesses from its admissibility to prove the conduct of the parties.
Sections 62 to 66 deal with the admissibility of character evidence when it is being
used to attack or support the credibility of witnesses. This section deals with
character evidence sought to be admitted to prove the conduct of a party on a
specified occasion.
In most other cases character evidence as circumstantial evidence is of slight
probative value. Even when it is slightly probative it usually ought to be excluded
because of the possibility of prejudice, the consumption of time and the confusion
of the issues. But in some cases, for instance civil cases where there is an allegation of moral turpitude, the probative value of character evidence might outweigh
these dangers. These matters, however, require no special provision. They can
adequately be dealt with under the general rule (section 5) that such evidence
may be excluded. 6

Separating those provisions which relate to character evidence to show
disposition or conduct, from those provisions which deal with character
evidence in relation to credibility, would be of great assistance in the development and understanding of the law, as demonstrated by some of the
cases. But separate provisions as to admissibility and mode of proof would
be helpful only insofar as such separation indicates that mode of proof is
a distinct and separate factor to be considered in relation to admissibility,
but not if separation leads to the belief that mode of proof is unrelated to
admissibility.
2.

Modes of Proof

Character evidence may take the form of opinion evidence, evidence of
reputation, specific instances of conduct, or evidence of habit or custom.
Opinion is the summation of one's views on the character or trait of character of another. Reputation is the summation of the views on a person's
character or character trait held by a group of people, usually the community. Specific instances of conduct can include individual events which reveal
character or a particular trait of character. Habit or custom is narrower than
character in that it most often illustrates particular character traits, rather
than the whole character and often reflects only a particular aspect of a
character trait; for example, an employee's invariable habit of placing the
day's receipts in the company vault is only one aspect of the character trait
of carefulness or trustworthiness. Character could be said to be the sum of
one's habits.
6 Supra, note 1 at 63, 65.
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Habit or custom is not treated as a separate area of the law in English
and Canadian law, but rather, it is dealt with as a variety of similar fact
evidence.7 American authorities consider habit to be distinct from character,
although it is treated as being very similar to evidence of character going to
show disposition. In Canadian and English cases, the rules governing the
admissibility of evidence of habit are not distinguished from those governing
the admissibility of character evidence showing disposition.
The degree of admissibility of the three types of character evidence and
evidence of habit depends upon the use to which they are being put. Gener-

ally, the law prefers evidence of reputation to evidence of opinion, and prefers opinion evidence to evidence of specific conduct or habit. The reason
lies with the degree to which these types of evidence are said to cause undue
prejudice, confuse the issues, distract, engender undue consumption of time
in side issues or cause unfair surprise. Reputation evidence is seen as the
variety of character evidence least likely to antagonize these principles. However, it is also the least revealing of character. Specific acts of conduct are most
likely to be the most probative of character, but are also the most likely to cause

prejudice.
The most eloquent defence of reputation over other types of character
evidence can be found in Michelson v. U.S.8 Jackson J., delivering the opinion
of the Supreme Court of the United States, stated:
When the defendant elects to initiate a character inquiry, another anomalous rule
comes into play. Not only is he permitted to call witnesses to testify from hearsay,
but indeed such a witness is not allowed to base his testimony on anything but
hearsay. What commonly is called "character evidence" is only such when "character" is employed as a synonym for "reputation." The witness may not testify
about defendant's specific acts or courses of conduct or his possession of a particular disposition or of benign mental and moral traits; nor can he testify that
his own acquaintance, observation, and knowledge of defendant leads to his own
independent opinion that defendant possesses a good general or specific character,
inconsistent with commission of acts charged. The witness is, however, allowed
to summarize what he has heard in the community, although much of it may have
been said by persons less qualified to judge than himself. The evidence which the
law permits is not as to the personality of defendant but only as to the shadow
his daily life has cast in his neighborhood. This has been well described in a
different connection as "the slow growth of months and years, the resultant picture
of forgotten incidents, passing events, habitual and daily conduct, presumably
honest because disinterested, and safer to be trusted because less prone to suspect.
It is for that reason that such general repute is permitted to be proven. It sums
up a multitude of trivial details. It compacts into the brief phrase of a verdict the
teaching of many incidents and the conduct of years. It is the average intelligence
drawing its conclusion." Finch, J., in Badger v. Badger, 88 N.Y. 546, 552, 42
Am. Rep. 263.
While courts have recognized logical grounds for criticism of this type of
opinion-based-on-hearsay testimony, it is said to be justified by "overwhelming
considerations of practical convenience!' in avoiding innumerable collateral issues
7For example, see, R. v. CanadianPacific R. Co. (1912), 5 D.L.R. 176; 2 W.W.R.
627 (Alta. S.C.), where the contents of a box were proved by the usual routine in packing and shipping supplies. In Joy v. Phillips, Mills & Co. Limited, [1916] 1 K.B. 849;
85 LJ.K.B. 770 (C.A.), the cause of a fatal accident was inferred from prior actions of
the deceased in teasing horses, and from the habit of the horse in question.
8 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213 (1948).
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which, if it were attempted to prove character by direct testimony, would complicate and confuse the trial, distract the minds of jurymen and befog the chief issues
189 N.Y. 408, 419, 82 N.E. 718, 22
in the litigation. People v. Van Gaasbeck,
L.R.A., N.S., 650, 12 Ann. Cas. 745. 9

The proposed federal Evidence Code formulated by the Law Reform
Commission of Canada (hereinafter referred to as the "Evidence Code")
would do away with the distinctions made among the various types of character evidence by making them all equally admissible. Section 20 states:
Evidence of a trait of a person's character may be given in the form of opinion,
evidence of reputation or evidence of specific instances of conduct.

The commentary on this section implies that the potential probative
value of specific instances of conduct outweighs the principles of undue
prejudice and time consumption, which are two of the grounds for the present rule. 10 The present rule excludes evidence of character to prove conduct where such evidence takes the form of specific instances of conduct
except where character is in issue or admissibility is allowed by the rules as
to similar fact evidence. The commentary looks to the Evidence Code's residual discretion to exclude evidence in section 5. However, the weighing and
balancing of interests, as required by section 5, carries the potential of a voir
dire for each piece of evidence which attempts to prove character by a specific
instance of previous conduct or by individual opinion. Thus, the Evidence
Code sees the potential probative value of all types of character evidence whether of general reputation, individual opinion or specific instances of
conduct - as possibly outweighing the needs of efficient trial administration.
In contrast, Rule 405 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence allows
proof of character by reputation or opinion, and restricts proof of character
by specific instances of conduct to cases where character is in issue as an
essential issue. The proposed Tentative Draft Vermont Rules of Evidence released in October 1977, contain a provision (Rule 405) which is identical to
Rule 405 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence."
Rule 405: (a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character
or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony
as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination,
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof
may also be made of specific instances of his conduct.

The California Evidence Code, section 1102,12 provides that evidence of
the defendant's character used to prove conduct may be in the form of
opinion or reputation. Section 11031s provides that in a criminal action,
character of the victim may be proved by evidence of opinion, reputation or
specific instances of conduct. The Uniform Rules, 1953, provide in Rule 4614
for proof of character by opinion, reputation or specific instances of conduct.
9Id. at 447-78 (U.S.); 219 (S.Ct.).
'o Supra,note 1 at 66.
11 Supra, note 2, Rule 405.
12 Supra, note 3, section 1102.
1 Id., section 1103.
14 Supra, note 4, Rule 46.
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American codifications deal with evidence of habit in rules which are
separate from those dealing with character. Rule 406 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence states:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine
whether corroborated or not and regardless of the
relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or
occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine

practice of an organization,
presence of eyewitnesses, is
organization on a particular
practice.

The reference to eye-witnesses arose from the fact that courts were reluctant
to receive evidence of habit to show a particular act except where there were
no eye-witnesses. Similar provisions have been placed in the California Evidence Code (sections 1104, 1105), and the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
1953 (Rule 49). Rule 406(b) of the Tentative Draft Vermont Rules of Evidence states that habit or routine practice may be proved by opinion or "by
specific instances of conduct sufficient in number to warrant a finding that
the habit existed or that the practice was routine." The Reporter's Notes
under this provision indicate that a similar provision was eliminated from
the Federal Rules by Congress to allow case-by-case treatment.' 5
Section 19 of the Evidence Code is very similar to Rule 406:
Nothing in section 17 prohibits the admission of evidence of habit or routine
practice to prove conduct in conformity with the habit or routine practice on a
particular occasion.

Therefore, the Evidence Code differs from the existing Canadian law in that
the rule governing evidence of habit or routine practice is separate from the
rules which govern similar fact evidence. However, it gives no greater guidance than the present law as to whether evidence of habit should be limited
to reputation or opinion or whether the habits of business practice should
be more readily admitted than the habits of individuals. These distinctions
are made in the American case law.
When one considers the differences among the American codifications,
one is, at first, tempted to leave the mode of proving character or habit to
case law development, as does the British law. The British Criminal Law
Revision Committee in its Eleventh Report, Evidence (General),16 was content to be no more precise as to mode of proof than to recommend the expression, "disposition or reputation," but without defining it. 7 However, the
Report states that the Committee's intention is to alter the common law rule
that the meaning of character is "reputation only and not disposition."' I s
Therefore, the Committee seems to have left substantial scope for case law
development, even if the replacement expression proves not to have the intended effect.
Given the fact that different types of character disposition evidence involve varying degrees of prejudice, confusion, time consumption and surprise,
'5

Rule 406(b) of the Draft Vermont Rules comes from Rule 406(b) of the Uni-

form Rules of Evidence which is one of the few provisions where those rules differ from
the U.S. Federal Rules.
16 Cmnd. 4991 (1972).

17 Id., sections 6 and 7 at 169.
18 Id. at 220.
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it does seem prudent to leave to the courts the formulation of principles
which make the use of evidence of reputation, opinion, specific acts, and
habit dependent upon the type of conduct or disposition intended to be proved.
For example, Courts may see greater prudence in allowing psychiatrists to refer
to specific instances of conduct when giving their expert opinion on character
traits than in allowing laymen to do so when testifying with respect to a person's
disposition toward peacefulness or violence. The courts may more readily
accept opinion in relation to business custom than to individual habit. Or,
the courts may exclude psychiatric opinion where it concerns the effect of
alcohol on the capacity to form the necessary intent, but admit it where it
concerns psychopathy. However, the author interprets the proposed Evidence
Code as not excluding such case law development. It can be argued that section 20 goes no further than to change a mandatory common law rule, that
character evidence must be in the form of general reputation, into a permissive rule that it may also take the form of opinion or specific instances of
conduct. Because of the presence of "the big override,"' 9 the trial judge's
residual discretion in section 5 to exclude evidence otherwise admissible,
section 20 should be construed as being permissive, not mandatory. The
court should not have to admit character evidence regardless of the form in
which it is tendered simply because it is admissible under sections 17, 18 or
19. However, even if the wording of section 20 results in some lack of clarity
as to the relationship between admissibility and mode of proof, the presence
of a provision such as section 20 makes clear that there are different methods
of proving character and that character need no longer be restricted to reputation. The question is whether the Evidence Code makes clear that these
different modes of proof should be subject to separate considerations.
3.

The Characterof the Accused in Criminal Proceedings

In criminal proceedings, the well established rules on character evidence
as circumstantial evidence to prove conduct are as follows:
1. Evidence of the accused's bad character cannot be used by the prosecution to establish guilt.
2. As an exception to the general rule against character evidence to
prove conduct, the accused can adduce evidence of his own good
character.
3. Where the accused adduces evidence of his own good character, the
prosecution may adduce evidence of his bad character in reply.
4. Evidence of character must be in the form of general reputation in
the community and not evidence of individual opinion or of specific
instances of conduct.
5. Character witnesses must qualify by showing such acquaintance
with the accused and the community in which he has lived as to be

39

This expression is used by Professor Paul Rothstein in relation to the very similar

provision in Rule 403 of the Federal Rules. See Rothstein, An Evidence Code: The

American Experience (1977), 36 C.R.N.S. 274, which contains an excellent analysis of
the Evidence Codes opinion evidence provisions.
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able to speak
with authority on the manner in which he is generally
2 0

regarded.

It should be kept in mind that these are general rules which are subject to
more specialized principles relating to psychiatric evidence, res gestae, and
similar fact evidence which can be thought of as being either exceptions
to the general rule or separate areas having their own rules.
The theory underlying the exclusion of bad character evidence for purposes of showing guilt is not that such evidence is irrelevant, but rather, that
it may be given undue weight by the jurors. The accused, who is shown to
have a bad general reputation or character, would be denied a fair opportunity to defend himself against a particular charge. There would be too great
a risk that he would be convicted for what he is and not judged for what he
has done. The theory has given rise to an exclusionary rule, the rationale of
which is to prevent the probative dangers of confusion of issues, unfair surprise
and undue prejudice. 21 Therefore, the resulting rule would prevent the use of
other criminal acts to show that the accused committed the crime for which
he is being tried because he is a man of criminal character.22
In contrast, the second rule, which allows proof of good reputation, is
justified as an exception to the hearsay rule, because it involves none of the
dangers of the first rule of conviction for generally bad conduct or bad
reputation. "The fact that a man has an unblemished reputation leads to
the presumption that he is incapable of committing the crime for which he
is being tried." 23 Potentially at least, it does carry the danger of an acquittal
20

See, generally, R. v. Rowton (1865), 169 E.R. 1497; [1865] All E.R. Rep. 549 and
supra, note 8.
21
The term "probative dangers" is found in Edward W. Cleary (ed), McCormick's
Handbook on the Law of Evidence (2d ed., St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1972) at
441. The probative dangers are identified as prejudice, confusion, time consumption and
surprise: "Judges and text writers have sometimes described the process of excluding
evidence having probative value, by reason of these counter-factors of prejudice, confusion, time-consumption and surprise, as the application of a standard of 'legal
relevancy.'"
22
However, evidence of other criminal acts may be admissible if adduced for some
other purpose, and if so, the rule against character evidence is inapplicable. Such purposes are more specific than character and usually relate to particular individual issues.
But, as McCormick, id. at 448, points out, the range of relevancy outside the character
ban is almost infinite: (1) res gestae to complete the story by proving its immediate
context; (2) to prove a larger plan, scheme or conspiracy of which the present crime is
a part, relevant as showing motive and therefore the doing of the criminal act or the
identity of the actor and his intention; (3) to prove other crimes by the accused so
nearly identical as to label them as the handiwork of the accused, or as carrying his
distinctive signature or trademark; (4) to show a passion or propensity for illicit sexual
relations with the particular person concerned in the crime on trial or to show certain
unnatural sex crimes so unusual that such acts with anyone are strongly probative of
like acts; (5) to negative inadvertence, accident or lack of intention or lack of knowledge; (6) to establish motive and therefore identify deliberate malice or specific intent;
(7) to show by immediate inference, malice, deliberation, ill will or specific intent; (8)
to prove identity, but usually in conjunction with (2), (3) or (6) above, as a means
of getting to identity; (9) conduct by the accused to obstruct justice or to avoid punishment for the present crime; (10) proof of prior convictions to impeach the accused
when he testifies.
23
R. v. Rowton, supra, note 20 at 1502 (E.R.); 552 (All E.R. Rep.).
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of a person who is in fact believed guilty. However, this is one variety of equitable discretion or criminal equity which we are content to leave to juries. 24
In fact, it has been said that evidence of good character, although irrelevant,
is received in criminal cases as a gesture of humanity 25 and mercy.20 However,
others argue that evidence of character is always evidence of guilt, meaning
that no distinction of substance can be drawn between evidence of facts and
evidence of character because character is laid before the jury to induce a belief
in the improbability that a person of good character could have conducted
himself in the manner alleged by the prosecution. 27 From this analysis, it is only
a small step to the argument made more recently, that to abolish this right to
lead evidence of good reputation would nullify the rule which requires the removal of any reasonable doubt prior to conviction. It is argued that such evidence bears directly on the question of reasonable doubt and is "part and
parcel of our scheme which forbids conviction for other than specific acts
criminal in character and which, in their trial, casts over the defendant the
presumption of innocence until he is proved guilty beyond all reasonable
doubt."28 The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that evidence of good
character can be adduced to show not only that it was unlikely that the accused
committed the crime charged, but that he was not the kind of person likely to
do so.29
The third rule, which allows bad character evidence in rebuttal, is said to
be justified by the need to protect the trier of fact from being misled by evidence
of the accused's witnesses as to good character, in that, ".

..

[i]f the prisoner

thinks proper to raise that issue as one of the elements for the consideration
of the jury, nothing could be more unjust than that he should have the advantage of a character which, in point of fact, may be the very reverse of
that which he really deserves."8 0 Therefore, the accused's good character
evidence "opens the door" to the prosecution's bad character evidence. The
concern of defrauding the trier of fact outweighs the danger of convicting
24

Any prosecutor who has worked with grand juries before they were abolished in

Ontario has seen this equitable power of human nature to dispose of cases at work,
for it accounted for many of the two or three percent of bills of indictment which
resulted in "no bills" or partial "true bills." The members of a grand jury might conclude that they should save the taxpayer and the accused the expense of a jury trial
on a charge if it were not among the more serious and if the accused had no prior

criminal
record.
25

Hurst v. Evans, [1917] 1 K.B. 352 at 357, per Lush J. and R. v. Miller, [1952]
2 All2 6E.R. 667, per Devlin J.
In R. v. Stirland (1943), 30 Cr. App. R. 40 (H.L.), Viscount Simon L.C. stated
at 54: "This allowing of evidence of a prisoner's good character to be given has grown
from a desire to administer this part of our law with mercy as far as possible. It has
sprung up from the time when the law was, according to the common estimation of
mankind,
severer than it should have been."
27
R. v. Stannard (1837), 7 C. & P. 673; 173 E.R. 295, per Patterson J., quoted in
Cross, On Evidence (4th ed. London: Butterworths, 1974) at 350.
28
Supra, note 8 at 491 (U.S.); 226 (S.Ct.) per Rutledge I. dissenting (Murphy J.

concurring).
29 R. v. Barbour (1938), 71 C.C.C. 1 at 20; [1939] 1 D.L.R. 65 at 67; [1938] S.C.R.
465 at 469, per Duff C.J.C.
30

R. v. Rowton, supra, note 20 at 1502 (E.R.); 551 (All E.R. Rep.).
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the accused on the basis that he is a man of criminal character or reputation.
However, as in the case of evidence of good character, evidence of bad character should be limited to a trait of character relevant to the charge being
tried. But, "if a prisoner put his character in issue, he puts his whole character in issue, not such parts as may be convenient to him, leaving out the
inconvenient parts." 31 Other arguments used to justify the admission of
character reply evidence are first, that it is not the accused's prior conduct
or character in fact which is put in issue, but rather his reputation, 2 and
second, the accused could have avoided the evidence of bad reputation by not
calling witnesses to testify as to his good reputation.
By leading evidence of good character, the accused runs the risk that
the prosecution will adduce evidence of prior convictions. Section 593 of the
Criminal Code of Canada3 8 provides:
Where, at a trial, the accused adduces evidence of his good character the prosecutor may, in answer thereto, before a verdict is returned, adduce evidence of
previous
the previous conviction of the accused for any offences, including any
84
conviction by reason of which a greater punishment may be imposed.

Moreover, there is no limitation requiring that the conviction be relevant to
the character trait under consideration. This follows from the principle of
the indivisibility of the accused's character. However, evidence of good charopinion, rather than general reputation, does
acter in the form of personal
35
not activate the section.
In addition, witnesses testifying as to the accused's good character may
be asked questions with respect to his prior convictions and arrests. Cross
states:
When dealing with the position at common law, successive editions of Archbold
have contained a statement to the following effect:
If the defendant himself endeavours to establish a good character, either by
calling witnesses himself, cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution,
prosecution is at liberty, in
or by himself giving evidence to that effect, 8the
6
most cases, to prove his previous convictions.
on special statutes this passage was
Although originally based on cases turning
approved by a dictum in R. v. Redd,8 7 and, in the absence of any judicial expression of doubt on the subject, it may be assumed that any character witness
in any criminal proceedings may be asked about a previous conviction of the
31
R. v. Samuel (1956), 40 Cr. App. R. 8 at 11. See also R. v. Winfield, [1939]
4 All E.R. 164; 27 Cr. App. R. 139.
32 ,... for it is not the man that he is, but the name that he has which is put in
issue." Supra, note 8 at 479 (U.S.); 220 (S.Ct.), per Jackson J. delivering the opinion
of the U.S. Supreme Court.
33 R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-34, section 593.
3
4 This principle was not unknown at common law, see text, infra, note 38. As
well, the accused when testifying can be questioned as to prior convictions pursuant to
section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act. However, such evidence when adduced, can
only be used in assessing the accused's credibility as distinguished from character to
prove conduct on a particular occasion.
35R. v. Demyen (No. 2), [1976] 5 W.W.R. 324; 31 C.C.C. (2d) 383 (Sask. QA.).
30 Archbold, Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases (38th ed. London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1973) para 558.
37 [1923] 1 K.B. 104.
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accused, and, as a matter of strict law, the accused's previous convictions may,
it seems, be proved in rebuttal.38

Again, the prior convictions and arrests need not relate to the charge under
investigation.39
The theory which allows cross-examination with respect to arrests is
based on the fact that character evidence by way of reputation is a variety of
hearsay; therefore, the accused's good character witnesses should be subject
to cross-examination as to the contents of the hearsay on which they base
their conclusions. One would expect character witnesses, who truly know the
accused's reputation in the community, to have heard about an arrest. It is
a matter that could be expected to affect reputation. Therefore, according to
the theory, the questioning of character witnesses about prior arrests of the
accused is permissible, not only to test the reputation testified to, but also
to test the qualifications of the witness to testify to the opinion of the community. In the Michelson case, it was stated:
Another hazard is that his own witness is subject to cross-examination as to the
contents and extent of the hearsay on which he bases his conclusions, and he may
be required to disclose rumors and reports that are current even if they do not
affect his own conclusion. It may test the sufficiency of his knowledge by asking
what stories were circulating concerning events, such as one's arrest, about which
people normally comment and speculate. Thus, while the law gives defendant the
option to show as a fact that his reputation reflects a life and habit incompatible
with commission of the offense charged, it subjects his proof to tests of credibility designed to prevent him from profiting by a mere parade of partisans.
A character witness may be cross-examined as to an arrest whether or not it
culminated in a conviction, according to the overwhelming weight of authority.
This rule is sometimes confused with that which prohibits cross-examination to
credibility by asking a witness whether he himself has been arrested.
Arrest without more does not, in law any more than in reason, impeach the
integrity or impair the credibility of a witness. It happens to the innocent as well
as the guilty. Only a conviction, therefore, may be inquired about to undermine
the trustworthiness of a witness.
Arrest without more may nevertheless impair or cloud one's reputation. False
arrest may do that. Even to be acquitted may damage one's good name if the
community receives the verdict with a wink and chooses to remember defendant
as one who ought to have been convicted. A conviction, on the other hand, may
be accepted as a misfortune or an injustice, and even enhance the standing of one
who mends his ways and lives it down. Reputation is the net balance of so many
debits and credits that the law does not attach the finality to a conviction, when
the issue
is reputation, that is given to it when the issue is the credibility of the
convict.40

The Court then went on to reject what was said to be the Illinois Rule,
which limits questions about arrests to closely similar, if not identical, charges.
3

8 Cross, supra,note 27 at 349.
39Id. at 349. Cross cites R. v. Winfield, supra, note 31 at 165 (All E.R.) for this
proposition, stating that the Court of Criminal Appeal was clearly of this opinion.
Humphreys I. expressed approval of the cross-examination because, "[t]here is no such
thing known to our procedure as putting half a prisoner's character in issue and leaving
out the other half." However, Cross, at 349, note 7, raises the question whether the
cross-examination in question may have been of Winfield himself, in which case different
considerations would apply.
40 Supra, note 8 at 479-80, 482-83 (U.S.); 220, 221-22 (S.Ct.) per Jackson J.
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The good character that the defendant sought to establish dealt with "honesty
and truthfulness" and "being a law-abiding citizen," which was broader than
the charge of bribing a federal officer. The character witnesses had been
cross-examined respecting a twenty year old conviction for violation of trademark law and an even older arrest for receiving stolen goods. It was pointed
out that the crimes of bribing and receiving proceed from the same defects
of character which the character witnesses said the defendant did not exhibit.
The Court held:
It is not only by comparison with the crime on trial but by comparison with the
reputation asserted that a court may judge whether the prior arrest should be
made the subject of inquiry. By this test the inquiry was permissible. It was proper
cross-examination because reports of his arrest for receiving stolen goods, if admitted, would tend to weaken the assertion that he was known as an honest and
may take in as much ground as the
law-abiding citizen. The cross-examination
41
testimony it is designed to verify.

However, the court did point out that the trial judge should exercise a

discretion to exclude or control such evidence, in order to prevent the true
issues from being obscured and confused. The residual discretion in a trial
judge in Canada may no longer be that wide.42
In England, subsection 1 (f) of The Criminal Evidence Act, 1898,4s
provides that an accused person called as a witness cannot be asked or be
required to answer any question tending to show that he has committed or
has been convicted or charged with any offence, or that he is of bad character, unless, (1) the offence is admissible to show that he is guilty of the
offence wherewith he is then charged, or (2) he has asked questions of prosecution witnesses to establish his own good character, or has given evidence of
his good character, or his defence involves imputations on the character of
the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution, or (3) he has given evidence against any other person charged with the same offence. Therefore,
adducing evidence of good character allows the prosecution to question the
accused, if he testifies, as to his prior convictions. In addition, evidence of the
accused's good character allows the prosecution to call character evidence in
rebuttal. 44 However, the accused opens the door to the prosecution's evidence
of bad reputation only if he adduces evidence as to his own character, but not
if he questions the prosecution witnesses as to their criminal records so as to
show that they are unreliable. 45 Cross further points out that cross-examination
of the accused under The CriminalEvidence Act, 1898, is very restricted:
Counsel for the prosecution is repeatedly admonished not to drive the accused
41
Id.
42

at 483-84 (U.S.); 222 (S.Ct.).
In The Queen v. Wray, [1970J 4 C.C.C. 1 at 17; 11 D.L.R. (3d) 673 at 690;
[1971] S.C.R. 272 at 293, it was said that the trial judge's power to exclude evidence is
limited to that which is "gravely prejudicial to the accused, the admissibility of which
is tenuous, and whose probative force in relation to the main issue before the Court is
trifling."
43 12 Halsbury's Statutes of England (Third Edition) 865.
44 Cross, supra, note 27 at 347.
45
R. v. Butterwasser, [1948] 1 K.B. 4; [1947] 2 All E.R. 415. See id. at 347 where
Cross points out that if he had given evidence after cross-examining the Crown witnesses
on their character, he would have exposed himself to questions about his past, pursuant
to The CriminalEvidence Act, 1898, supra, note 43.
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into throwing his shield away. 4 6 Even if this was not, in any sense, the purpose
of the cross-examination, it may be held to have been improper because the
crucial question is its effect upon the minds of the jury, not the purpose with
which it was administered. 4 7 A further safeguard is provided by the requirements
that Crown counsel should obtain the approval of the judge before embarking
on cross-examination under s. 1(f).48. 49

The principal Evidence Code provision dealing with character in relation to disposition is section 17(1):
In criminal proceedings evidence tendered by the prosecution of a trait of character of the accused that is relevant solely to the disposition of the accused to act or
fail to act in a particular manner is inadmissible, unless the accused has offered
evidence relevant to a trait of his character or to a trait of the character of the
victim of the offence.

This provision maintains the character evidence rule in criminal cases established by R. v. Rowton.5" However, it contains the added feature of allowing
the prosecution to lead evidence of bad character where the accused attacks
the character of the victim. Yet, the residual discretion given to the trial
judge by section 5 of the proposed Evidence Code bx to exclude evidence, is
much wider than the formulation handed down in The Queen v. Wray, 2 and
may, therefore, allow bad character evidence to be limited to the character
trait in issue and thus, do away with the indivisibility-of-character principle.
Section 5 should also allow the trial judge to limit cross-examination of the
accused's good character witnesses, particularly where they are tested as to
their knowledge of rumour and mere arrests without conviction. Further,
this residual discretion to exclude evidence would be even more important in
relation to character evidence than it is now because section 20 of the proposed Evidence Code would allow the prosecution to adduce bad character
evidence in the form of opinion and specific instances of conduct as well as
reputation. Therefore, any good character evidence obtained by the accused
through cross-examination of Crown witnesses or adduced by his own witnesses would open the door to a wide variety of bad character evidence,
subject only to whatever limitation section 5 provided.
In England, the Criminal Law Revision Committee in its Eleventh
Report, Evidence (General) of June 1972, recommended a provisionP8 of
similar effect, except that it does not refer to a trait of character of the victim, and in addition, it does allow a co-accused to adduce evidence of the
accused's bad "disposition or reputation" where the accused adduces good
46R. v. Eidenow (1932), 23 Cr. App. R. 145.
47 The King v. Ellis, [1910] 2 K.B. 746; R. v. Sugarman (1935), 25 Cr. App. R.
109.

48

R. v. McLean (1926), 19 Cr. App. R. 104; 134 L.T. 640.

49 Cross, supra,note 27 at 359.

50 R. v. Rowton, supra,note 20.
51
Supra, note 1, section 5 states: "Evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, or undue consumption of time."
52 Supra, note 42.
53 Supra, note 16, section 7 of the Draft Criminal Evidence Bill at 178.
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character evidence.54 Section 17 of the proposed Evidence Code is silent in
regard to the co-accused. However, the Evidence Code is, in general, inclusive, and only in particular exclusive; therefore, its main theme should prevail: "All evidence is admissible except as provided in this Code or any
other Act."'5 Also, the Criminal Law Revision Committee recommended a
than leaving
provision 6 similar to section 593 of the Criminal Code rather
57
the same matter dependent upon the dictum in R. v. Redd.
Rule 404 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence is very similar to section 17, except that in addition, it deals more specifically with the character
trait of peacefulness of the victim in homicide cases:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same, or evidence of a character trait or peacefulness of the victim
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the
victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided
in rules 607, 608, and 609 [credibility].
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
of absence of mistake or accident.

The Evidence Code deals more specifically with the character of the victim
of a sexual offence than do the U.S. Federal Rules. Section 17 (2) states:
In criminal proceedings, evidence of a trait of the character of the victim of a
sexual offence that is relevant solely to the disposition of the victim to act or
fail to act in a particular manner is inadmissible, unless the judge at the hearing
in camera is satisfied that the admission of such evidence is necessary for a fair
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.

This provision is similar to the present section 142 of the Criminal Code, unless there is a substantial difference resulting from the phraseology: "just
determination of an issue of fact in the proceedings, including the credibility
of the complainant," as opposed to section 17's, "fair determination."
The California Evidence Code provisions, sections 1102 and 1103, are
similar in effect to those of the Federal Rules and the proposed Vermont
Rules (Rule 404). However, Rule 47 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence,

1953, would also require rejection of evidence of specific behaviour to prove
a character trait, except for evidence of conviction of a crime.
5
4 For an example of admissible bad character evidence of psychopathy given by a
psychologist and adduced by a co-accused against the accused, see Lowery v. The Queen,
[1973] 3 All E.R. 662; [1974] A.C. 85; [1973] 3 W.L.R. 235 (P.C.).
55 Supra, note 1, section 4(1).
GO Supra, note 16, section 7(2).
57 Supra,note 37 and accompanying text.
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Generally, codifications do not define what is character evidence or
what type of evidence puts character in issue. Is character put in issue only
when a witness is asked the standard question, "Do you know the reputation
of Mr. Smith for honesty in business matters in the community where he
lives?" Or, almost invariably, counsel will lead each of his witnesses through
a brief biographical sketch, including details about family life and work record; in addition, witnesses are instructed as to appropriate dress for court.
Although these are matters intended to give the trier of fact some indication
of the moral flavour, respectability and reliability of the witness, it would be
very unusual, in Canada, if such practices were understood to put character
in issue. However, in England, the Criminal Law Revision Committee was
concerned that such devices had attained a degree of sophistication that
enabled good character evidence to be adduced without putting character in
issue. The Committee members referred to this matter as "hinting indirectly
that the accused is a respectable person.15 8 Therefore, they recommended that
in lieu of the phrase, "has personally or by his advocate asked questions of
witnesses for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good character
or has given evidence of his good character," which appears in section l(f)(ii)
of The Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, that the phrase, "personally or by his
advocate asked questions of any witness with a view to establishing directly or
by implication that the accused is generally or in a particular respect a person
of good disposition or reputation," be substituted. 9 The Committee's reasons
are worth quoting in full:
135. There is an important question as to what should count as claiming to be of
'good character' for the purpose of the rule. At present a person is treated as
setting up his good character not only when he expressly claims this but also
when he tries to achieve the same effect indirectly by evidence suggesting that
he is a respectable person. For example in Coulman69 Swift, J., during the argument in the Court of Criminal Appeal, gave as an instance of setting up character
that of asking a man 'whether he is a married man with a family, in regular work,
and has a wife and three children'. But the ingenuity of modem criminals has
developed a practice of giving the impression that the criminal is a respectable
person while avoiding taking any course which clearly enables the court to hold
that the accused 'has personally or by his advocate asked questions of witnesses
for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good character, or has given
evidence of his good character' within the meaning of paragraph (f) (ii). An
example is provided by a case which was tried at the Central Criminal Court
about three years ago. One of two men charged with conspiracy to rob (both had
long criminal records) went into the witness box wearing a dark suit and looking
as if he were a respectable business man. When asked by his counsel when and
where he met his co-accused, he said: 'About eighteen months ago at my golf
club. I was looking for a game. The secretary introduced us'. In another case the
defence contrived to introduce evidence suggesting that the accused, who lived
on crime, was negotiating for the purchase of a substantial property. We think
that it would be useful to strengthen the law by applying the rule to the introducgenerally or in a particular respect
tion of evidence 'with a view to establishing
a person of good disposition or reputation'. 61

In contrast, section 17 of the proposed Evidence Code is much more
58

Supra, note 16, at 86, parn 136.
9 Id., section 7 (1) (a) of the Draft Evidence Bill at 178.
60 (1927), 20 Cr. App. R. 106, 108.
61 Supra, note 16 at 86.
5
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general; it does not speak of direct or indirect evidence, but simply of "evidence relevant to a trait of his character." This is the course to be preferred,
thus leaving to the trial judge greater latitude to determine, from all the circumstances, including the context of the evidence and the demeanour of the
witnesses, whether evidence of good character has been led and whether
character has been put in issue, not only by the implication of the speaker,
but also by the inference of the listener.
4.

Psychiatric Evidence of Propensity or Dispositions

Psychiatric evidence, as demonstrated by the recent cases, is an area
where the rules respecting character evidence conflict with and must be reconciled with those respecting expert opinion evidence, and where the distinction between character evidence as to disposition or propensity, and
character as to credibility, becomes blurred. For example, the principal rule
of character evidence is that such evidence must be given in the form of
general reputation in the community and not in the form of individual opinion
or specific instances of conduct. But psychiatric evidence, in dealing with
traits of character, must be in the form of individual opinion and must reveal specific instances of conduct in order to provide a foundation for that
opinion. When the psychiatrist supports the accused's testimony by stating
that his psychological testing reveals a lack of intent, or a lack of capacity to
form the necessary intent, the question arises whether the psychiatrist is
giving an opinion on the accused's capacity for veracity, i.e., credibility, or
upon his disposition to commit a particular act.
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect that psychiatric evidence
will develop in the future into a separate branch of the law of evidence,
rather than make its reconciliation with any single part of it. Psychiatric evidence will develop its own rules by reaching a partial reconciliation with the
rules of opinion evidence, with the rules of character evidence to show disposition, and with the rules of character evidence as to credibility. However,
at present psychiatric evidence is still struggling with these three branches of
the law of evidence as though it were intended that it become the exclusive
possession of one of them rather than establish its own independent domain,
which is, in the opinion of this author, more appropriate. Therefore, to
understand the present position of psychiatric evidence in relation to psychological propensity, it is necessary to consider its position in relation to all
three of these areas.
62 The distinction between character evidence in proof of conduct on a particular
occasion and character evidence in relation to credibility is usually made by use of the

terms, "character as to disposition or propensity," and "character as to credibility."
This terminology is confusing in that one can have a disposition or propensity to lie,
in which case the character evidence relates to credibility. The Evidence Code uses the
heading "Character and Disposition" in relation to character going to conduct (sections
17-20) and within section 17 it uses the phrase "disposition . . . to act or fail to act
in a particular manner," in relation to the term "character." Therefore, because of this
terminology and the previous practice, "character as to disposition" should be understood to refer to proof of conduct on a particular occasion as distinguished from
"character as to credibility."
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The following issues are the main concerns of the law of expert opinion

evidence.
(a) The Ultimate Issue Doctrine
Expert opinion evidence will not be received on the very issue the jury
has to decide; such evidence is said to usurp the function of the jury. The
ultimate issue doctrine is quickly losing its force as a rule of evidence, particularly in the area of psychiatric testimony.0 3 It is coming to be regarded
as having been used as a convenient means of excluding suspect evidence and4
of compensating a fear that juries would accept expert opinion blindly.0
Section 69 of the proposed Evidence Code follows the modem trend:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible may be
63

In R. v. Fisher, [1961] O.W.N. 94; 34 C.R. 320 (Ont. C.A.) aff'd. [1961] S.C.R.
535; 35 C.R. 107; 130 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.), a murder trial involving the testimony of
psychiatrists, Aylesworth J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal, delivering the opinion
of the majority, stated at 341 (C.R.) that, "[i]n many instances opinion evidence is
received upon the very issue the Court has to decide ...

."

In R. v. Lupien, [1970]

S.C.R. 263; [1970] 2 C.C.C. 193; 9 C.R.N.S. 165, on a charge of attempting to commit
an act of gross indecency, the trial judge refused to admit evidence of a psychiatrist
that the accused had a strong aversion to acts of homosexuality and would not have
knowingly engaged in such acts. In the Supreme Court of Canada, three of five justices,
(Ritchie, Spence, and Hall J.) were against treating the ultimate issue doctrine as a
rule of evidence. The doctrine plays no part in the criteria established for the admissibility of psychiatric opinion evidence by the Ontario Court of Appeal in the subsequent
cases of R. v. McMillan (1975), 29 C.R.N.S. 191; 23 C.C.C. (2d) 160; 7 O.R. (2d) 750
(Ont. C.A.) aff'd (1977), 73 D.L.R. (3d) 759 (S.C.C.), and R. v. Robertson (1975),
29 C.R.N.S. 141; 21 C.C.C. (2d) 385 (Ont. CA.). However, the same court seems
to be willing to revive it for special occasions, such as the new field of polygraphy, see
R. v. Phillion (1975), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 191; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 319; 5 O.R. (2d) 656
(Ont. C.A.) aff'd (1977), 37 C.R.N.S. 361; 33 C.C.C. (2d) 535 (S.C.C.).
64
Cross, supra, note 27 at 389. Philip C. Stenning, Expert Evidence-The Hearsay
Rule and the 'Ultimate Issue' Doctrine (1970), 9 C.R.N.S. 181. The Ontario Law Reform Commission's Report on the Law of Evidence, supra, note 5 at 153 first points
out that no such rule was recognized in decisions in the first half of the last century,
and then argues that the rule is illogical in that all testimony relates to an ultimate
issue and therefore, "In theory, no expert, bound by the rules of relevancy and materiality
would be permitted to testify to anything under a broad formulation of the ultimate
issue rule." (at 155). However, the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Phillion, id., was
not prepared to rule admissible, evidence of a polygraph examiner that the accused
truthfully answered questions during a polygraph test as to whether he had killed the
victim. The Court held this evidence was properly rejected because, "the witness was
being asked to express his opinion directly, that the accused had not committed the act
constituting the offence charged." (at 192 (C.C.C.); 320 (D.L.R.); 657 (O.R.)). However, the Supreme Court in Phillion v. The Queen, id., made no similar reference to
testimony prohibited because it deals directly with the ultimate issue for the trier of fact,
but instead dismissed the appeal because the polygraph examiner had neither the qualifications nor the opportunity to form a mature opinion of the propensity of the man tested,
either as to truthfulness or otherwise, and because the statements made to him by the
accused were self-serving. The reconciliation of Phillion with Lupien is discussed infra
at p. 465. McCormick, On Evidence, supra, note 21, commenting on the trend in the
American cases to abandon or reject the ultimate issue doctrine, states at 27: "This change
in judicial opinion has resulted from the fact that the rule excluding opinion on ultimate
facts in issue is unduly restrictive, pregnant with close questions of application and the
possibility of misapplication, and often unfairly obstructive to the presentation of a party's
case, to say nothing concerning the illogic of the idea that these opinions usurp the function
of the jury."

19781

CharacterEvidence

received in evidence notwithstanding that it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact.
It is almost an exact copy of Rule 704 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence:
Opinion on Ultimate Issue. Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to
be decided by the trier of fact.
The Ontario Law Reform Commission, in its Report on the Law of Evi-

dence, recommends a similar provision.6 5 In addition, the English Civil Evidence Act 1972, section 3(1), allows expert evidence, "on any relevant
matter on which he is qualified to give expert evidence;" this provision has
given effect to a recommendation of the English Law Reform Committee in
1970. 66 A similar recommendation was made in respect of criminal proceedings by the Criminal Law Revision Committee in 1972.67
(b)

The Common Knowledge or 'Normal Facts' Rule

The subject matter of the inquiry must be such that ordinary people
are unlikely to form a correct judgment about it if unassisted by persons
with special knowledge. If the issue is held to concern a matter of common

knowledge, expert evidence will not be received on that issue;68 the expert
testimony is said to be superfluous, 69 or unnecessary. The 'normal facts' rule
has much vitality; in fact, in relation to psychiatric and psychological testing,
it is increasing. 70 The main concerns used to justify the rule are the fear
GGSection 15 of the Draft Evidence Act of the Ontario Report, supra, note 5 at
256, states: "Where a witness in a proceeding is qualified to give opinion evidence, his
evidence in the form of opinions or inferences is not made inadmissible because it
embraces an ultimate issue of fact."
6
Seventeenth Report of the Law Reform Committee, Evidence of Opinion and
G
Expert Evidence, Cmnd. 4489 (1970), at 31.
6
7Supra, note 16 at 203. Section 43(1) of the Draft Criminal Evidence Bill of the
Report puts forward substantially the same provision that was enacted in the English
Civil Evidence Act of 1972.
6
8For example, in R. v. Chard (1971), 56 Cr. App. R. 268, it was held that the
intent of the ordinary man is not a proper subject for receiving expert opinion evidence,
for such is a matter within the realm of common knowledge. See also R. v. Robertson,
supra note 63 and R. v. French (1977), 37 C.C.C. (2d) 201 (Ont. CA.) discussed
infra,note 70.
0
9 The common knowledge, normal facts rule is sometimes referred to as the superfluous rule. However, a similar designation is given to the rule which prevents expert
opinion evidence being received on questions of law or mixed questions of law and
fact. See also the discussion infra, note 75 and accompanying text.
70
In R. v. Robertson, supra, note 63, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that a
crime calling for a mere disposition for violence was not so uncommon as to allow for
psychiatric evidence even though the evidence showed that the murder in question was
committed by acts of great brutality. In R. v. French, supra, note 68, the same court
upheld the trial judge's exclusion of psychiatric evidence that a Crown witness (to whom
the accused allegedly confessed murder), had a character disorder such that she was
quite capable of lying under oath. The psychiatrist agreed with the suggestion that a
layman could come to the same conclusion as he did from observing the witness, which
agreement foreclosed admissibility. The Court feared the jury would be overwhelmed
by the expert and deviate from its task of assessing credibility on the basis of its own
observations, and thus there would be a usurpation of the jury's function. See also R. v.
Dubois (1976), 30 C.C.C. (2d) 412 (Ont. C.A.). However, the current strength of the
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that the jury will be overwhelmed by the testimony of the expert, and will,
therefore, not make its own assessments of fact. Secondly, there is the concern
that the jury's function will be usurped, which seems to be expressing the same
71
concern in different ways.
The Evidence Code, instead of requiring a determination of what matters lie within common knowledge, merely requires that expert opinion evidence, "assist the trier of fact." Section 70 states:
When scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine an issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

This test should be much easier to apply than the 'normal facts' rule which
forces an inappropriate extension of the power of judicial notice in order to
determine which matters are of common knowledge. On the other hand, it
may lessen the power of the judge to keep from juries suspect expert opinion
evidence where it is feared such evidence may unduly influence them.
Section 70 of the proposed Evidence Code is taken almost verbatim
from Rule 702 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence. The provision is consistent with the present trend of law reformers to rely more upon the increasing sophistication of juries rather than upon exclusionary rules which
keep potentially dangerous information from them. However, the Ontario
and British law reform reports propose no amendments to the existing law
on admissibility. 72
(c) Questions of Law
Opinion evidence will not be received on questions of law or on mixed
questions of law and fact.73 It is argued that expressions of opinion on such
rule in recent case law has not removed differences of opinion as to its application. For
example, in R. v. Fisher, supra, note 63, the dissenting opinion of Laidlaw J.A. (Porter
C.J.O., concurring), would have rejected psychiatric testimony on a question of capacity
-to form the necessary intent in connection with the effect of alcohol, because the jury
was just as capable as the psychiatrist of forming a correct judgment from the facts
that he took into consideration. The majority judgment held that the psychiatrist was
qualified to express such an opinion, that the subject matter of that opinion was within
the field of his expertise, and that, "the opinion would be of assistance to the jury."
Therefore, it was held that the psychiatric evidence was a proper subject for admissible
expert opinion evidence, which seems to be not another test for admissibility, but simply
another way of saying the testimony was not caught by the 'normal facts' rule.
71 For example, see R. v. French, supra, note 70.
72 The Ontario Law Reform Commission's Report on the Law of Evidence, supra,
note 5, does not deal with the 'normal facts' rule in its recommendations. The Criminal
Law Revision Committee's Eleventh Report, Evidence (General), supra, note 16, recommends a provision (section 43(4)) taken from the Civil Evidence Act 1972, section
3(4), which expressly preserves "any rule of law as to the topics on which expert evidence is or is not admissible."
73For recent decisions on the rule see R. v. Neil, [1957] S.C.R. 685; 26 C.R. 281;
111 C.C.C. 1; 11 D.L.R. (2d) 545, where a psychiatrist was asked to deal with the
Criminal Code definition of "criminal sexual psychopath." See also R. v. Fisher, supra,
note 63, where a psychiatrist was allowed to testify as to the accused's capacity to form
the intent to cause death and capacity to form the intent to cause bodily harm that he
knew was likely to cause death.
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questions are superfluous, since a jury which has been properly instructed is
as capable of applying the law as is the witness.7 4 Therefore, this rule and
the ultimate issue doctrine have a similar rationale-to avoid superfluity;
however, they serve different purposes. The former avoids a duplication of
the judge's rulings on the law, whereas the latter avoids a duplication of the
jury's findings of fact and the application of law to fact. 75
This rule can be justified in that it forces expert opinion evidence to be
given in a form which makes its relevance to the issues more apparent. Therefore, it is more useful to the jury. For example, it is not nearly as helpful to
the trier of fact to have a psychiatrist testify that the accused acted out of
insanity, as to have him testify whether the accused appreciated the nature
and quality of his act or knew that it was wrong.7 6
(d) The Need for the Hypothetical Question
Until recently, it was common practice to elicit expert opinion evidence
on the basis of a hypothetical question. The question stated certain facts
which the witness was asked to assume were true for purposes of providing
a foundation for the opinion sought to be elicited. This hypothetical form
served two purposes; first, it indicated upon which facts the opinion was
based; and second, it avoided having the expert make a decision on which
witnesses or evidence were to be believed. However, it has now been decided that the failure of counsel to put such questions in hypothetical form
77
does not, of itself, make the answers inadmissible.
In the United States, the hypothetical question has been greatly criticised as providing too great an opportunity for summing-up in the middle of
the case, as being overly time-consuming, and as encouraging partisan bias
by improperly restricting the witness so that the full nature of his opinion
is not revealed. 78 If these criticisms apply in Canada as well, the hypothetical form of questioning should be put aside. But the court should have the
power to require that the foundation facts upon which an opinion is based be
articulated by the witness. Therefore, the proposed Evidence Code provides:
Section 68: The judge may require that a witness be examined with respect to the
facts upon which he is relying before giving evidence in the form of an opinion
or inference.
74

Therefore, this rule is sometimes referred to as the superfluous rule, as is the
ultimate issue doctrine.
75 The Ontario Law Reform Commission's Report, supra, note 5 at 155, suggests
the one rule should be dissolved into the other: "were the ultimate issue rule narrowly
interpreted to prohibit only expressions of opinion on issues which are mixed questions
of fact and law, as in the Wright and Neil cases, it would be generally justifiable on
the general basis that opinion testimony ought to be received only when is necessary
and helpful."
76 See R. v. Wright (1821), 168 E.R. 895.
77
Bleta v. The Queen, [1964] S.C.R. 561; 48 D.L.R. (2d) 139; [1965] 1 C.C.C. 1.
However, it was also held that the trial judge could require the hypothetical form in
order to make clear on what evidence the expert opinion is based.
78 For example, see the comments to Federal Rule 705 made by the Advisory
Committee on Evidence which prepared the Proposed Federal Rules on Evidence (The
Supreme Court Draft), as reproduced in, Federal Rules of Evidence for United States
Courts and Magistrates (St. Paul: West Publishing CO., 1975).
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However, the Evidence Code also contains a marginal note "Hypothetical
questions," which accompanies the following provision:
Section 71: An expert may base an opinion or inference on any of the following:
(c) facts admitted or to be admitted in evidence in the proceedings and assumed
by the expert to be true for the purpose of giving the opinion or making the
inference.

(e) Strict Proof of Foundation Facts
One theory holds that since expert opinion evidence is completely dependent for its reliability on the foundation facts upon which it is based,
those facts should be strictly proved by admissible evidence. 79 An opposing
theory holds that the foundation for the reliability of expert opinion evidence
lies not in the strict proof of the foundation facts, but in the qualification of
the witness as a true expert testifying in a valid field of expertise and solely
within his field of expertise. The expert opinion is itself a new evidentiary fact.
Because the witness qualifies as an expert, his skill and training are to be relied
upon to sort out those pieces of information which are reliable, rather than the
sorting-out being done by strict proof of foundation facts. The expert bases
his opinion not upon such strictly proven facts, but rather upon the types of
information obtained by the methods normally used by those in his field.
It is now well established in the case law that the opinion of an expert
can be adduced without strict proof of the foundation facts.8 0 The proposed
Evidence Code would allow similar latitude. Section 71 states:
An expert witness may base an opinion or inference on any of the following:
(a) facts perceived by him;
(b) facts made known to him before the hearing, even if such facts are not admitted or admissible in evidence, so long as they are of a kind reasonably relied
upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences on the subject; and
(c) facts admitted or to be admitted in evidence in the proceedings and assumed
by the expert to be true for the purpose of giving the opinion or making the
inference. 81

79

In R. v. Turner, [1975] 1 All E.R. 70 (C.A. Crim. Div.), psychiatric evidence
was called on a defence of provocation to murder, to show why the appellant was likely
to be provoked and to support the credibility of his version of what had happened.
Lawton L.J., delivering the judgment of the Court, stated at 73:
He could have said that all the facts on which the psychiatrist based his opinion
were hearsay save for those which he observed for himself during his examination
of the appellant such as his appearance of depression and his becoming emotional
when discussing the deceased girl and his own family. It is not for this court to
instruct psychiatrists how to draft their reports, but those who call psychiatrists
as witnesses should remember that the facts on which they base their opinions
must be proved by admissible evidence. This elementary principle is frequently
overlooked.
8
0 City of Saint John v. Irving Oil Co. Ltd., [1966] S.C.R. 581; 58 D.L.R. (2d) 404;
R. v. Lupien, supra, note 63; Wilband v. The Queen, [1967] S.C.R. 14; [1967] 2 C.C.C.
6; 2 C.R.N.S. 29. It is not necessary for the psychiatrist to have examined the accused
in order to testify on his capacity to form the necessary intent, see R. v. Fisher, supra,
note 63. Also, the opinion can be adduced without reference to foundation facts, see
Perras v. The Queen (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 449; 35 D.L.R. (3d) 596; 22 C.R.N.S.
160 (S.C.C.).
81
Supra, note 2. Rule 703 is very similar, but to the first two paragraphs only.
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However, under the present case law, the expert opinion may be excluded in a situation where the accused has chosen not to testify and the
foundation facts consist of self-serving statements of the accused. In R. v.
Rosik,829 the psychiatrist's opinion that the accused lacked the capacity to
form the necessary intent was based on out-of-court statements of the accused
that he had consumed librium and whiskey on the day of the killing. The
Ontario Court of Appeal split equally on the issue of whether the psychiatrist's opinion was inadmissible because it was based on hearsay in the absence of the accused's testimony. In Phitlion v. The Queen,s3 the evidence
of a polygraph examiner as to the truthfulness of statements made by the
accused during a polygraph test, that he did not kill the victim, was excluded.
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld this ruling, giving as one of its reasons the fact that the opinion evidence was based on "self-serving, second
hand evidence tendered in proof of its truth on behalf of an accused who
did not see fit to testify....
,,84 In both of these cases the expert was asked
to testify, not upon a character trait going to disposition, (i.e., not upon
character going to prove conduct), but rather upon the credibility of the
accused's out-of-court statements. The same could be said of R. v. Dietrich,8 5
wherein similar psychiatric testimony was allowed. However, in Dietrich, the
accused testified. In both Dietrich and Phillion, the expert opinion evidence
was tendered to explain away out-of-court confessions. For that purpose it
was admissible. But in Phillion it was said to offend the rule against selfserving statements because the accused did not testify.8 6 The Court in R. v.
Lupien87 also required the psychiatrist to assess the veracity of out-of-court
statements by the accused. But in that case, the psychiatrist was testifying as
to a character trait or disposition (homosexuality) in relation to conduct
on a particular occasion, and not simply as to the credibility of out-of-court
statements; in addition, the accused testified.
The cases analyzed thus far suggest that with respect to the character
of the accused, distinctions can be drawn between expert opinion evidence
as to disposition going to conduct on the one hand, and credibility on the
other, and between those cases where the accused does, or does not testify.
These distinctions give rise to an important exception to the principle that
expert opinion evidence can be adduced without strict proof of the founda82 [1971] 2 O.R. 47; 2 C.C.C. (2d) 351; 13 C.R.N.S. 129 (Ont. C.A.). The Supreme Court of Canada did not deal with the admissibility of the psychiatrist's testimony, see (1971), 14 C.R.N.S. 400; 2 C.C.C. (2d) 393n; [1971] S.C.R. vi.
83
Supra, note 63 (S.C.C.).
841d. at 367 (C.R.N.S.); 540 (C.C.C.) (S.C.C.), per Ritchie J.for the majority.
The trial judge did allow a psychiatrist to testify as to the accused's veracity, and to base
his opinion upon the polygraph test, among other tests (see 21 C.R.N.S. 169). However,
the appellate courts did not deal with the admissibility of the psychiatrist's testimony.
85 [1970] 3 O.R. 725; 1 C.C.C. (2d) 49; 11 C.R.N.S. 22 (Ont. C.A.) leave to
appeal refused [1970] S.C.R. xi; 1 C.C.C. (2d) 68n.
887he accused having testified in Dietrich, the psychiatric evidence that he was a
pathological liar would have offended the rule as to impeaching one's own witness.

However, such evidence was admissible for the purpose of explaining away his out-

of-court admissions. See Stenning, Admissibility of Guilty Pleas and PsychiatricEvidence
of Capacity for Veracity (1970), 11 C.R.N.S. 43 at 54.
8

7 R.

v. Lupien, supra, note 63.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 16, NO. 2

tion facts. The parameters of this exception should be further clarified; is it
operable with respect to both distinctions or merely with respect to the distinction as to whether the accused testifies? Similarly, is it applicable regardless of whether the issue is identity or intent?
Now that the main rules concerning character evidence and expert opinion evidence have been set out, an attempt can be made to formulate rules
of psychiatric evidence respecting propensity or disposition to prove conduct
on a particular occasion, by examining the interaction between these two
bodies of rules.
CharacterEvidence

Expert Opinion Evidence

1. Evidence of the accused's bad character cannot be used by the prosecution to
establish guilt.

1. The ultimate issue doctrine: expert
opinion evidence will not be received on
the very issue the jury has to decide, for
such is said to usurp the function of the
jury.
2. The 'normal facts' rule: the subject
matter of the inquiry must be such that
ordinary people are unlikely to form a
correct judgment about it if unassisted by
persons with special knowledge; expert evidence will not be received in regard to a
matter within the realm of common knowledge.
3. Questions of law: opinion evidence will
not be received on questions of law or on
mixed questions of law and fact.

2. As an exception to the general rule
against character evidence to prove conduct, the accused can adduce evidence of
his own good character.

3. Where the accused adduces evidence of
his own good character, the prosecution
may adduce evidence of his bad character
in reply.
4. Evidence of character must be in the
form of general reputation in the community and not evidence of individual opinion
or of specific instances of conduct.
5. Character witnesses must qualify by
showing such acquaintance with the accused and the community in which he has
lived so as to be able to speak with authority as to the manner in which he is
generally regarded.

4. The hypothetical question: expert opinion evidence need not be elicited by means
of a hypothetical question, however, the
trial judge can require this form of questioning be used in order to make clear what
evidence the opinion elicited is based upon.
5. Proof of foundation facts: the opinion
of an expert can be adduced without strict
proof of the foundation facts used in formulating that opinion.

Neither group, nor both of these groups of rules together, will adequately
explain the admissibility of psychiatric evidence. A separate body of rules is
necessary. For example, the analysis of the interaction of these two groups
of rules has shown a need for the following modification to the ultimate
issue rule (or more appropriately, an exception to the present waning importance of the ultimate issue rule) in relation to psychiatric evidence:
Psychiatric opinion evidence adduced by the defence may be given on the ultimate
issue or on any issue for the jury, except where the main thrust of such evidence
deals with the credibility of out-of-court statements of the accused, and the
accused has not testified. 88

88

Author's own formulation.
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Next, one must consider psychiatric evidence in relation to conduct on
a particular occasion as distinguished from credibility.
The leading decision on psychiatric evidence for propensity or disposition to show conduct on a particular occasion (or disprove conduct on a

particular occasion) in Canada is McMillan v. The Queen.89 The Supreme

Court of Canada adopted the reasons of Martin J.A. who delivered the
judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal. 90 Mr. Justice Martin first resolves
the conflict between the character evidence rule which requires that such
evidence be in the form of general reputation in the community, and the
opinion evidence rule, which allows a witness, properly qualified, to give his
own individual expert opinion, instead of mere general reputation evidence:
One of the exceptions to the general rule that the character of the accused, in the
sense of disposition, when admissible, can only be evidenced by general reputation,
relates to the admissibility of psychiatric evidence where the particular disposition
or tendency in issue is characteristic of an abnormal group, the characteristics of
which fall within the expertise of the psychiatrist.91

The psychiatrist is not bound by the general reputation rule if his evidence relates to a crime which the evidence indicates was committed by an abnormal
group. This 'abnormal group' element also satisfies the 'normal facts' rule of
the law of opinion evidence, because laymen are unlikely to have knowledge
of such matters and reach a correct decision in regard to them. In addition,
the 'abnormal group' concept helps to satisfy the rule of opinion evidence
that the expert may testify as an expert only on subjects strictly within his
field. The fact that the expert is properly within his field in dealing with a
particular subject also helps to satisfy the 'normal facts' rule.
Martin J.A. then goes on to hold that if, on the other hand, the evidence
does not support the existence of an 'abnormal group crime,' then defence
psychiatric evidence as to the accused's particular disposition or lack of a
particular disposition, amounts to nothing more than good character evidence. Such psychiatric opinion evidence is not admissible because the law of
character evidence requires that good character evidence take the form of
general reputation and not expert opinion:
Where the crime under consideration does not have features which indicate that
the perpetrator was a member of an abnormal group, psychiatric evidence that the
accused has a normal mental makeup but does not have a disposition for violence
or dishonesty or other
relevant character traits frequently found in ordinary
92
people is inadmissible.
While such evidence is relevant as bearing on the probability of the accused
having committed the crime, the psychiatric evidence proffered in such circumstances really amounts to an attempt to introduce evidence of the accused's good
character, as a normal person, through a psychiatrist. Such evidence does not fall
within the proper sphere of expert evidence and is subject to the ordinary rule
applicable to character evidence which, in general, requires the character of the
accused to be evidenced by proof of general reputation. 9 3
89 McMillan v. The Queen, supra,note 63 (S.C.C.).
90

R. v. McMillan, supra, note
Id. at 201 (C.R.N.S.); 169
92
1d. at 206 (C.R.N.S.); 174
93
1d. at 207 (C.R.N.S.); 175
91

63 (Ont. CA.).
(C.C.C.); 759 (O.R.) (Ont. C.A.).
(C.C.C.); 764 (O.R.) (Ont. C.A.).
(C.C.C.); 765 (O.R.) (Ont. C.A.).
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Therefore, it can be said that where the accused wishes to lead evidence of
his own good character, he cannot do so by adducing psychiatric opinion
evidence.
The next issue taken from McMillan concerns the character of third
parties. Can the accused lead psychiatric opinion evidence as to the disposition of a third party in order to show that it was more probable that the
third party committed the crime? Is such evidence admissible only in relation
to 'abnormal group crimes?' Can the accused lead psychiatric evidence to
show that some third party is an 'abnormal group' person, even though the
crime could have been committed by normal persons as well as 'abnormal
group' persons? The distinction is between psychiatric evidence as to 'abnormal
group' third parties in relation to 'abnormal group crimes,' and psychiatric
evidence as to 'abnormal group' third parties in relation to crimes which
are not exclusively 'abnormal group crimes.' If it is admissible, can the prosecution call psychiatric evidence in reply relating to the third party's disposition or to the accused's disposition?
In McMillan, the psychiatric evidence relating to an 'abnormal group'
concerned the disposition of the wife of the accused as constituting a psychopathic personality disturbance. Therefore, it was proper expert evidence by a
psychiatrist. But, was it rendered inadmissible by the rules of character evidence? This evidence was led by the defence to suggest that the wife of the
accused may have been the perpetrator of the crime, the murderer of their
child. The Crown argued that the injuries were not of such a character that
they could only have been inflicted by a person with a special or abnormal
propensity, and, therefore, psychiatric evidence of the wife's mental makeup
was not admissible. Martin l.A. replied that although the crime in question
was not one that could only be committed by a person with an abnormal
propensity, it did not necessarily follow that psychiatric evidence as to Mrs.
McMillan's disposition was, therefore, inadmissible. Such evidence might be
admissible for another purpose, such as the probability of the accused, or
another, having committed the offence.
Psychiatric evidence with respect to the personality traits or disposition of an
accused, or another, is admissible provided:
(a) the evidence is relevant to some issue in the case;
(b) the evidence is not excluded by a policy rule;
(c) the evidence falls within the proper sphere of expert evidence.
One of the purposes for which psychiatric evidence may be admitted is to
prove identity when that is an issue in the case, since psychical as well as physical
characteristics may be relevant to identify the perpetrator of the crime.
When the offence is of a kind that is committed only by members of an
'abnormal group', for example, offences involving homosexuality, psychiatric evidence that the accused did or did not possess the distinguishing characteristics
of that 'abnormal group' is relevant either to bring him within, or to exclude him
from, the special class of which the perpetrator of the crime is a member. In
order for psychiatric evidence to be relevant for that purpose, the offence must
be one which indicates that it was committed by a person with an abnormal
propensity or disposition which stamps him as a member of a special and extraordinary class.
Psychiatric evidence with respect to the personality traits or disposition of
the accused, or another, if it meets the three conditions of admissibility above
set out, is also admissible, however, as bearing on the probability of the accused,
or another, having committed the offence.
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As I have already indicated, Mrs. McMillan's disposition was relevant, in
the circumstances of this case, as bearing on the probability that the acts in
question were committed by her rather than her husband. Since her personality
traits were characteristic, indeed diagnostic, of the abnormal personality disturbance from which she suffered, their existence and description fell within
the proper sphere of the psychiatrist. Moreover, there is no policy rule which
required the exclusion of the evidence as to Mrs. MeMillan's personality traits
or disposition when tendered by the accused. All the conditions of the admissibility
of such evidence have accordingly been met. 94

Mrs. McMillan had testified, as a defence witness, that she did not
know how the injuries in question occurred. As a result, the evidence of the
defence psychiatrist that she had a psychopathic personality, and, therefore,
might have committed the crime, raised the objection that the defence had impeached the credibility of its own witness.9 5
It was conceded by the Crown, however, that if the evidence was admissible for another purpose, the fact of such impeachment did not require its
exclusion. This principle provides a reconciliation between the charactercredibility rule against impeaching one's own witness and the characterdisposition rule, discussed by Martin J.A., which allows for evidence of
disposition when it goes to identity.
Martin J.A. next turned to the question whether the Crown could adduce evidence of the accused's mental makeup if the evidence of Mrs. McMillan's mental makeup was admissible. His Lordship construed the psychiatric evidence of Mrs. McMillan's psychopathic propensity, plus the arguments
based upon it, as amounting to an assertion that the accused was a person
of normal mental makeup. Therefore, evidence of the accused's own psychopathic nature could be adduced by the Crown:
In those circumstances, Crown counsel was entitled to show, if he could, that
there were two persons present in the house who were psychopaths, not one. Any
other conclusion would permit an accused to present an entirely distorted picture
to the jury. The respondent having introduced psychiatric evidence to show that
it was more probable that his wife had caused the injuries to the child than
that he had caused them, because he lacked her dangerous characteristics, lost his
protection, in the circumstances of this case, against having his own mental
makeup revealed to the jury. 96

One could argue from this statement, that the rule which allows the Crown
to lead bad character evidence of disposition if the accused leads evidence of
his own good character, is applicable if the accused leads bad character evidence as to a third party witness, even if it is his own witness.
Moreover, it may not be necessary to limit this principle to third parties
94Id. at 205-07 (C.R.N.S.); 173-75 (C.C.C.); 763-65 (O.R.) (Ont. C.A.).
Or The rule as to impeaching the credibility of one's own witness is to be distinguished from contradicting one's witness on a matter of fact. Witnesses called by the
same party may contradict one another on various issues of fact without being held to
have impeached each other's credibility. See Harper v. Griffiths, [1930] 2 D.L.R. 565
at 566; 64 O.L.R. 688 at 670 (Ont. C.A.); Cariboo Observer Ltd. v. Carson Truck
Lines Ltd. and Tyrell (1961), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 36; 37 W.W.R. 209 (B.C.C.A.); R. v.
Hutchinson (1904), 8 C.C.C. 486 (B.C.C.A.).
06 R. v. McMillan, supra, note 63 at 209-10 (C.R.N.S.); 177-78 (C.C.C.); 767-68

(O.R.).
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who are witnesses, for the thrust of the defence evidence was simply that
there was another person who had an opportunity, and a disposition, to
commit the crime in question. The second principle that can be extracted from
this statement is that where the accused leads evidence of good character in
the form of expert opinion, the prosecution can similarly reply with opinion
evidence, rather than evidence of general reputation.
However, must a co-accused similarly wait for the accused to "open
the door" before leading evidence of the accused's psychopathic tendencies?
This situation is similar to that in McMillan; Martin l.A., therefore, argued
that the discussion in Lowery v. The QueenP' was relevant. The co-accused,
in that case, King, called a psychologist who testified regarding the accused
Lowery's psychopathic personality. The defence of each of the accused was
that the other had committed the killing in question. Martin l.A. construed
the admissibility of the evidence of the psychologist as being based upon the
probability that one of the accused had committed the offence, although, he
added: "the features of the offence in that case were sufficiently indicative
of the possession of an abnormal propensity by the perpetrator that the expert evidence might have been relevant to the issue of identity as well."0 81
He then concluded:
Since in that case the evidence was offered by the accused King, it was not
excluded by the policy rule which prevents the prosecution from introducing evidence to prove that the accused by reason of his criminal propensities is likely
to have committed the crime charged. 99

Guidance can be obtained from McMillan on one other issue in relation to
character evidence; namely, must the prosecution wait until the accused puts
his own character in issue before adducing bad character evidence in the
form of psychiatric opinion? Some of the statements in Martin J.A.'s judgement would suggest that the Crown need not wait for good character evidence
as a condition precedent to admissibility. 00
Parallels can be drawn between psychiatric evidence and similar fact
evidence, which is a variety of character evidence exempted from the rules
which apply to character evidence because of its particular probative value.
Similar fact evidence takes the form of specific instances of conduct rather
than general reputation, and the prosecution need not wait until character
is put in issue before similar fact evidence is led. If psychiatric evidence is
an equally unique form of character evidence, for example, if it is equally
probative of the issue of identity as is true similar fact evidence, then it
should be equally admissible. Psychiatric evidence should be governed by its
own rules of admissibility as is similar fact evidence. The language of Martin
J.A. leads one to suggest, for example, that psychiatric evidence, going directly to identity, as distinguished from psychiatric evidence going merely to
97 Supra, note 54.

98R. v. McMillan, supra, note 63 at 206 (C.R.N.S.); 174 (C.C.C.); 764 (O.R.)
(Ont. C.A.).
99 Id.
10 0 See note 94 and accompanying text.
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probability, should be admissible according to the same rules that govern
similar fact evidence.
Such a distinction between identity and crimes of abnormal propensity
on the one hand, and probability and particular persons of abnormal propensity on the other, can be justified by considering the two main factors which
govern the admissibility of similar fact evidence: prejudice and probative
value. If the evidence indicates that the crime in question could have been
committed by normal persons as well as by those of an abnormal group, then
evidence that the accused is a member of that abnormal group might well
increase the probability that he committed the crime, but it would also carry
a heavy prejudicial value. That is to say, the jury might well give it an importance which is beyond the statistical reality respecting the incidence of
people of that abnormal group committing the crime in question. Therefore,
the prosecution should not be able to lead such evidence unless the accused
leads evidence of good character. For example, a robbery with no unusual
features might be considered more likely to have been committed by a psychopath prone to crimes of violence. But the features of the crime would not
keep normal persons from also being suspected. Proof that the accused was a
criminally violent psychopath would involve the danger that undue emphasis
might be placed on such evidence with respect to the issue of identity. But,
allowing good character evidence without allowing bad character evidence in
reply, would create a false picture. Therefore, the psychiatric evidence should
be admissible, but only if the accused "opens the door" by putting his character
in issue. The facts in McMillan were said to have fitted into this category.
The accused led evidence of his wife's psychopathic tendencies, but it was
in relation to a crime which could have been committed by normal neonle
or people violent within normal bounds, as well as by people within that
abnormal group. Once the accused led such evidence, it was open to the prosecution to show that the accused was also a member of that abnormal group.
On the other hand. if the evidence shows that the crime could onlv have
been committed by those within a narticnlar abnormal group then psychiatric
evidence that the accused was a member of that group, has a probative
value which outweighs any prejudicial effect. Such psychiatric evidence shows
a 'trademark' and not simply a mere propensity as in the former example.
It raises more than a mere probability and, therefore, goes more directly
to identity. Therefore, it should be admissible regardless of whether the accused leads good character evidence or not.
The same distinction is made in regard to the admissibility of similar
fact evidence in general, and prior criminal convictions in particular. If the
similar fact evidence can be said to be so similar to the crime in question as
to demonstrate a 'trademark' in relation to its commission, then it is admissible as similar fact evidence. If it cannot, then it is admissible, if at all, not
as similar fact evidence, but as evidence of bad character in reply to good
character evidence adduced by the accused. Similarly, evidence of prior
crimes committed by the accused is admissible as similar fact evidence if it
can satisfy the high degree of similarity to the crime in question demanded
by the rules of similar fact evidence. If not, it is admissible on the issue of
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probability (i.e., identity), but only in reply to evidence of good character-see
CriminalCode, section 593.101
However, although the language of Martin l.A. in McMillan would
easily support an argument that he was drawing a distinction between crimes
of abnormal propensity and accused or third parties of abnormal propensity
in relation to crimes that don't necessarily require an abnormal propensity
and between evidence going directly to identity, and evidence going merely
to probability, it is not as clear that he intended different conditions of
admissibility to apply to these two types of evidence. 102 It is not completely
clear that he intended to put forward the proposition that psychiatric evidence in relation to a crime of abnormal disposition is admissible whether
or not the accused puts his character in issue. Portions of his judgement 03 in
McMillan suggest that the prosecution must wait until the accused leads evidence of his own good character (or at least evidence of the bad character
of a third party who had an opportunity to commit the crime in question)
before it can adduce any psychiatric evidence of propensity.
On the other hand, the following two paragraphs from the judgment of
Mr. Justice Martin in R. v. Robertson,0 4 would support a strong argument
that he did intend to create new rules for the admissibility of psychiatric
opinion evidence of propensity or disposition. What is new about them is
that they make the conditions of admissibility dependent upon the type of
psychiatric evidence offered, or upon the type of crime in relation to which it
is offered:
Evidence of disposition is also relevant to prove guilt but the introduction of
101 See the text accompanying note 33. There is a third route of admissibility of

prior criminal convictions. Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act provides that a
witness may be questioned as to his prior offences and such offences proved if the

witness denies the fact or refuses to answer. However, the trier of fact is to be instructed

that such evidence can be used only in relation to the credibility of the witness and not
in proof of a substantive issue in the trial such as identity, intent, or whether the crime
was in fact committed. In theory such caution is supposed to remove the danger that
such evidence will be used for this prohibited purpose, i.e., on issues of conduct and
intent to commit crimes, as distinguished from in-court credibility. The jury may use a
conviction admitted to in cross-examination to establish that the accused is a member
of an abnormal group and, therefore, infer that he is more likely to have committed
the crime in question. This danger and the compensating caution to the jury, therefore,
become particularly important in relation to trials of crimes which could have been
committed by normal persons as well as by abnormal persons, or by persons of a
different abnormal group. If the crime being tried could only have been committed
by a certain abnormal group, and the crime being cross-examined as to under section
12 would stamp the accused as a member of that abnormal group, then in theory, such
prior conviction could be used for a similar fact purpose as well as for credibility, if
there existed the required high degree of similarity demanded by the rules of similar
fact evidence. Therefore, the cross-examination on such prior conviction would have
to go further than merely establishing the fact of the prior offence in order to establish
the necessary points of close similarity. If such similar fact evidence could have been
given in reply as well as in chief, there should be no argument that the prosecution
was splitting its case by asking that the results of its cross-examination under section 12
be used in relation to substantive issues as well as credibility.
102 See R. v. Robertson, supra, note 63 at 185 (C.R.N.S.); 425 (C.C.C.).
1o Supra,note 99.
104 R. v. Robertson, supra, note 63.
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evidence by the prosecution which proves no more than that the accused had a
propensity or disposition to commit the crime in question is excluded on grounds
of policy, unless the accused gives evidence of good character, in which case the
prosecution is entitled to rebut such evidence.
Where the disposition in question is characteristic of an abnormal group, it
is a proper subject for expert evidence and hence may be proved or disproved by
psychiatric evidence, when otherwise relevant and admissible. 05

The first paragraph refers to evidence, the effect of which is merely to increase the probability that the accused committed the crime; therefore, its
admissibility is conditional on the accused adducing evidence of good character. The second paragraph deals with evidence of the accused's abnormal
propensity in relation to crimes requiring an abnormal propensity. Therefore,
it is more probative. It raises more than a mere probability as to identity. It
goes directly to proof of identity. It is more than mere evidence of good or
bad character; it is not dealt with as being within those categories of evidence, although it does deal with character. Therefore, its admissibility is not
conditional on or limited by the rules as to good or bad character evidence.
It is not dependent on the accused's "opening the door" by putting his character
in issue, nor is it subject to the rule requiring that character evidence be in
the form of general reputation in the community. Rather, it may be "proved
or disproved" directly, for it is not "excluded on grounds of policy" as in the
type of psychiatric evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, and it may be
proved by expert opinion evidence. In other words, the rules of admissibility
are dependent upon the type of crimes in relation to which the psychiatric
evidence is offered. If it attempts to show that the accused had a peculiar or
abnormal propensity or disposition, but is in relation to a crime which could
have been committed by normal people as well as by those within some particular abnormal group, it is inadmissible (unless the accused adduces good
character evidence) under the principle stated in the first paragraph. But if
the same type of psychiatric evidence as to the accused's disposition is offered
in relation to a crime which could only be committed by those within a particular abnormal group, then it is admissible without the need of the accused's
first putting his character in issue. This is the important issue in relation to
which the law of psychiatric evidence awaits clear and binding authority:
can the prosecution adduce evidence of the accused's abnormal propensity if
the crime at issue is one requiring an abnormal propensity, without the condition precedent of the accused's adducing evidence of his good character?
This issue can be further clarified by re-wording: Is psychiatric evidence of
an abnormal disposition in the accused (or a lack thereof) when offered in
relation to crimes requiring an abnormal disposition, evidence, the admissibility of which is independent of the rules as to good and bad character
evidence?
However, the issue did not arise in McMillan, for the accused was held
to have given what amounted to good character evidence and thus to have
put his character in issue. Nor did it arise in Robertson. The distinction was
not taken up by the Supreme Court of Canada in McMillan, 0 6 although that
decision was largely dependent upon the reasons of Mr. Justice Martin of
105 Id. at 185 (C.R.N.S.); 425 (C.C.C.).

10 R. v. McMillan, supra, note 63 (S.C.C.).
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the Ontario Court of Appeal. However, it is suggested that if one had to
make a decision on the issue based solely on the language used by the Supreme Court in McMillan, one would have to conclude that that language
supports the proposition that the first three rules of character evidence' 0 7
apply equally to all psychiatric evidence of disposition. Those three rules
state that evidence of the accused's bad character cannot be used by the prosecution to establish guilt unless the accused adduces evidence of good character. For example, Spence J., delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Canada, comments upon a quotation from Lowery:
'It is, we think, one thing to say that such evidence is excluded when tendered
by the Crown in proof of guilt, but quite another to say that it is excluded when
tendered by the accused in disproof of his own guilt. We see no reason of policy
or fairness which justifies or requires the exclusion of evidence relevant to prove
the innocence of an accused person.'
I further agree with Martin, J.A., that when such evidence is adduced by the
defence there is no policy preventing its admission such as the requirement of
fairness 0 to the accused which applies to prevent its being adduced by the
Crown.' o

There is no support here for the proposition that the prosecution may adduce
evidence of the accused's peculiar propensity without there having to be
evidence of the accused's good character as a condition precedent, even if
the crime is one requiring a peculiar or abnormal propensity.
But one does not have to base one's decision on this issue upon the language of the Supreme Court of Canada in McMillan if it is reasonable to
conclude either that Spence J. did not deal with it, or if he did, his comments
were obiter dicta because the facts did not require, or lend themselves to, a
decision on the issue. If so, it would be open to future courts to hold that
this distinction in the rules regarding the admissibility of psychiatric evidence
as to propensity or disposition in proof of conduct is a valid one, and that it
is supported by the judgments of Martin J.A. in McMillan and Robertson.
In Robertson, Martin J.A. adds one further principle and some insight.
That case also involved a crime held not to be exclusively an 'abnormal group'
crime. McMillan dealt with the admissibility of Crown psychiatric evidence of
the accused's abnormal propensity in relation to such crimes. Robertson deals
with defence psychiatric evidence regarding a lack of such propensity in relation to such crimes. The issue in Robertson was the admissibility of defence
psychiatric evidence to the effect that, "he [the accused] did not show any
violent or aggressive tendencies as character traits or psychiatric makeup
and the type of individual who would commit this type of offence is likely
one who would show these characteristics."' 0D9 The appellant was convicted of
the non-capital murder of a nine year old girl who was found dead in the
basement of her home. The physical evidence suggested that death was caused
by kicking. Martin J.A., in delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court on
10 7 See note 20 and accompanying text.
108 R. v. McMillan, supra,note 63 at 762-63 (D.L.R.) (S.C.C.).
109 R. v. Robertson, supra, note 63 at 181 (C.R.N.S.); 421 (C.C.C.).
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this branch of the case, summarized the conditions for the admissibility of
defence psychiatric evidence as to the disposition of the accused:
In my view, psychiatric evidence with respect to disposition or its absence is
admissible on behalf of the defence, if relevant to an issue in the case, where the
disposition in question constitutes a characteristic feature of an abnormal group
falling within the range of a study of the psychiatrist, and from whom the jury
can, therefore, receive appreciable assistance with respect to a matter outside the
knowledge of persons who have not made a special study of the subject. A mere
disposition for violence, however, is not so uncommon as to constitute a feature
characteristic of an abnormal group falling within the special field of study of
the psychiatrist and permitting psychiatric evidence to be given of the absence
of such disposition in the accused.
In this case the evidence shows no more than that the young deceased was
killed by an act of great brutality. It cannot be said that such an act would only
be committed by a person with recognizable personality characteristics or traits.
In these circumstances, I am not persuaded that the evidence in the present case
justifies us in holding that the killing of the deceased was marked by features

which identify its perpetrator as a member of a special class more readily identifiable than the ordinary criminal, which I consider to be a condition of the
admissibility of psychiatric evidence of absence of disposition0 or behavioural
incapacity when it is tendered on the basis advanced before us."

These are the conditions of admissibility of that variety of circumstantial
evidence in proof of conduct or absence of conduct on a particular occasion,
known as psychiatric evidence of disposition on behalf of the defence. The
first condition is relevancy to an issue in the case (as distinguished from
credibility). Second, this opinion evidence must relate to the features of an
abnormal group in order to escape the rule that character evidence must be
in the form of general reputation in the community. Third, it must satisfy
the opinion evidence rule that the subject matter in question (the abnormal
group), falls within the range of study of the expert. Fourth, the 'normal
facts' rule of opinion evidence must be satisfied by showing that the trier
of fact will be assisted in regard to a matter outside the knowledge of laymen. The fifth condition is the new requirement added to the analysis that Mr.
Justice Martin began in McMillan, namely, a mere disposition for violence
will not establish the crime in question as necessarily having been committed
only by an abnormal group, nor will an act of great brutality necessarily do
so either. Sixth, the necessary 'abnormal group' cannot be established if the
evidence goes no further than to show that the crime in question was more
likely committed by members of some abnormal group, but does not exclude
or sufficiently diminish the possibility that it could have been committed by
normal persons as well.
In an attempt to formulate rules which are specifically applicable to
psychiatric evidence, this discussion may be summed up thus far by the
following statements:
(a) General Rule as to Psychiatric Evidence
Psychiatric evidence with respect to the personality traits or disposition
of an accused or another is admissible provided that first, the evidence is
"Old. at 189-90 (C.R.N.S.); 429-30 (C.C.C.).
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relevant to some issue in the case; second, the evidence is not excluded by
a policy rule; and third, the evidence falls within the proper sphere of expert
evidence.
(b) Evidence on the Ultimate Issue
Psychiatric evidence may be given on the ultimate issue or on any other
issue for the jury.
(c) Limitation as to Matters of Common Knowledge, Normal Facts
Psychiatric evidence must concern a matter about which ordinary people
are unlikely to form a correct judgment if unassisted by such persons with
special knowledge. If the issue is held to be one of common knowledge, such
expert evidence will not be received on that issue, for it is superfluous. Psychiatric evidence defining, identifying or explaining an abnormal character
trait, or a character trait of an abnormal group, concerns matters outside
the common knowledge of ordinary people.
(d) Limitation as to Matters of Law
Psychiatrists cannot testify directly upon questions of law or upon
mixed questions of law and fact, for these questions are within the province
of the trial judge.
(e) Hypothetical Questions
In examination-in-chief, failure to elicit the opinion of a testifying psychiatrist by means of hypothetical questions does not of itself make the
answers inadmissible; however, the trial judge can require the hypothetical
form of questioning in order to make clear on what evidence the expert
opinion is based.
(f) Limitation Where Accused Does Not Testify
Psychiatric evidence may be given without strict proof by admissible
evidence of the foundation facts upon which it is based, except where such
opinion evidence, adduced by the defence, does not concern a character trait
going to disposition, but rather concerns the credibility of the accused's outof-court statements and the accused does not testify.
(g) Exceptions to General Reputation Evidence
Psychiatric evidence concerning a particular trait which is properly
admissible into evidence, may be given in the form of opinion evidence, and
therefore, it is not caught by the rule requiring that character evidence be
given in the form of general reputation in the community.
(h) Abnormal Group Exception to General Reputation Evidence
One of the exceptions to the rule that the character of the accused in
the sense of disposition, when admissible, can only be by evidence of general
reputation, relates to the admissibility of psychiatric evidence where the
particular disposition or tendency in issue is characteristic of an abnormal
group, the characteristics of which fall within the expertise of the psychiatrist.
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(i) Limitation as to Good Character Evidence
Where the evidence does not indicate that the crime in question was
necessarily committed by an abnormal group, defence psychiatric evidence
as to the accused's particular disposition or lack of a particular disposition,
(although relevant as bearing upon the probability of the accused having
committed the crime), is inadmissible, for it is evidence of good character
and, therefore, violates the rule that such evidence must be given in the form
of general reputation in the community.
(j) Impeaching Credibility
Psychiatric evidence which impeaches the credibility of a witness of the
same party who called the psychiatrist is not rendered inadmissible by the
rule against impeaching the credibility of one's own witness, if such evidence
is relevant to another purpose.
(k) Distinction Between Probability and Identity
Psychiatric evidence as to the probability that one has committed an
offence is distinguishable from psychiatric evidence going directly to identity.
Where the crime in question is one which was not necessarily committed by
a member of some identifiable abnormal group, evidence that the accused
or another had or lacked an abnormal propensity, goes merely to the probability that the accused committed the crime. Where the crime in question
is one which the evidence indicates was committed by a member of an identifiable abnormal group, evidence that the accused or another had or lacked
such abnormal propensity goes directly to identity. Both varieties of evidence
relate to identification of the person who committed the crime. However, the
former variety is much less probative than the latter, and, therefore, falls
under different considerations as to admissibility.
(1) Evidence as to Probability
Although the evidence does not indicate that the crime in question was
necessarily committed by an abnormal group, psychiatric evidence as to the
abnormal disposition of a third party who had an opportunity to commit the
crime is nonetheless relevant, for it bears upon the probability of the accused's having committed the crime. It is also admissible, for there is no
policy rule which requires its exclusion when tendered by the accused.
(m) Evidence as to Identity
Where the offence is of a kind that is committed only by members of
an abnormal group, psychiatric evidence that the accused did not possess the
distinguishing characteristics of that abnormal group is relevant either to bring
him within or exclude him from the special class of which the perpetrator of
the crime is a member.
(n) Limitation Upon Evidence of Disposition for Violence
A mere disposition for violence will not establish the crime in question
as necessarily having been committed only by an abnormal group, nor will
an act of great brutality.
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(o) Third Party Disposition as Evidence of Good Character
Psychiatric evidence adduced by the accused as to the propensity of a
third party may be construed as evidence of the accused's good character, in
which case, the prosecution may lead evidence of the accused's bad character,
also in the form of psychiatric evidence.
(p) Evidence Adduced by Co-Accused
Psychiatric evidence adduced by an accused as to the propensity of a coaccused to act or fail to act in a particular manner, is not excluded by the
policy rule which prevents the prosecution from introducing evidence to
prove that the accused by reason of his criminal propensities is likely to have
committed the crime.
The proposed Evidence Code provisions on character and disposition do
not encompass the detailed rules that seem to be emerging from the most
recent cases on psychiatric evidence. However, the provisions are capable
of incorporating them, or rules similar to them. For example, section 17(1)
contains a rule comparable to the present rule that bad character evidence
cannot be adduced by the prosecution, except in reply to the character evidence offered by the accused dealing with the character of the accused or the
victim of the offence. It would seem, therefore, that the Evidence Code would
not allow the prosecution to adduce psychiatric evidence about whether the
accused fell within an abnormal group even if the crime can be said to be
exclusively that of an abnormal group, until the accused has first adduced
evidence of a trait of either his or the victim's character. And, section 17(2)
places a limitation on character evidence in relation to the victim in sexual
offences, by requiring that a voir dire be held to determine the admissibility
of such evidence. The present rule allows evidence of general reputation for
morality to be adduced without a voir dire. However, given the breadth of
sections 18 to 20, the court would be free to develop rules for psychiatric
evidence as to disposition, and for character evidence in general, limited only
by the spirit of the residual discretion to exclude such evidence by section 5,
and the rule which requires exclusion of evidence that would bring the administration of justice into disrepute in section 15. These are not substantial
limitations upon the court's freedom to develop specific rules. The more limiting of the two sections is section 5, which will be no more limiting upon the
creativity of the court than to provide guidance by citing the fundamental
principles which gave rise to most of the existing exclusionary rules of evidence-probative value, prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury
and undue consumption of time.
5.

Characterof the Victim

The disposition of the victim of a crime is usually treated as a separate
area of the law of character evidence. The proposed Evidence Code does not
deal directly with the admissibility of evidence as to character of the victim.
However, by inference, such must be admissible if relevant. Section 17(1)
allows the prosecution to lead evidence of a character trait of the accused if
the accused has offered evidence relevant to a character trait of the victim of
the offence. In England, The CriminalEvidence Act, 1898, section 1 (f) (ii),
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permits the accused to be asked about previous convictions if he adduces
evidence as to his own good character, or if "the nature or conduct of the
defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor
or the witnesses for the prosecution." Federal Rule 404(a) (2) also allows
evidence of a pertinent character trait of the victim of the crime offered by
the accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, and in addition, allows
"evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor." Martin J.A. actually went further in the McMillan case by allowing reply evidence where the accused attacks a third party who is not the
victim.
At common law, the accused can adduce evidence as to the disposition
of the alleged victim of a rape in the form of reputation evidence."" The
following landmark quotation makes an important distinction between character evidence going to credibility and character evidence going to disposition:
The prosecutrix may be asked the questions to shew that her general character
of chastity is bad. She is bound to answer such questions and if she refuses to
do so the fact may be shewn: Rex v. Clarke (1817), 2 Stark. 244; Rex v.
Barker (1829), 3 C. & P. 589, 172 E.R. 558; Regina v. Holmes (1871), L.R. 1
C.C.R. 334, 337. So too she may be asked whether she has previously had connection with prisoner and if she denies it that may be shewn: Rex v. Martin (1834),
6 C. & P. 562. Such evidence is relevant to the issue since in both cases it bears
directly upon the question of consent and the improbability of the connection
complained of having taken place against the will of the prosecutrix.
And she may be asked, but, inasmuch as the question is one going strictly
to her credit, she is not generally compellable to answer whether she has had
connection with persons other than the prisoner. This seems to rest to some extent
in the discretion of the trial Judge. Whether, however, she answers it or not that
is an end of the matter, otherwise as many collateral, and therefore irrelevant
issues might be raised as there were specific charges of immorality suggested, and
the prosecutrix could not be expected to come prepared to meet them, though
she might well be prepared to repel an attack upon her general character for
chastity: Rex v. Hodgson (1811), R. & R. 211; Regina v. Lalibertg 1 S.C.R. 117;
Regina v. Holmes (1871), L.R. 1 C.C.R. 334; Phipson on Evidence, 3rd ed. 158,
453.112

Questions as to sexual conduct with people other than the accused are now
dealt with under section 142 of the CriminalCode of Canada. Section 17(2)
of the Evidence Code establishes a similar voir dire procedure, but deals
with a wider category of evidence: "a trait of the character of the victim of
a sexual offence that is relevant solely to the disposition of the victim to act
or fail to act in a particular manner...." This phrase would submit disposi-

tion evidence in the form of general reputation for chastity to a voir dire
procedure. In contrast, section 142 of the Criminal Code refers only to the
"credibility evidence" of sexual conduct with persons other than the accused.
Does such evidence also relate to disposition so as to come within section
I" In England, evidence of specific instances of conduct has been allowed in the
case of prostitutes or to show indiscriminate sexual habit. See R. v. Krausz (1973), 57
Cr. App. R. 466.
112
The King v. Finnessey (1906), 10 C.C.C. 347 at 351; 11 O.L.R. 338 at 341
(Ont. C.A.), and quoted in R. v. Basken and Kohl (1975), 28 C.R.N.S. 359 at 377

(Sask. C.A.).
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17(2), or would such evidence be dealt with under the credibility provisions
of the proposed Evidence Code (sections 62-66), which do not require a
voir dire (although there is a power of exclusion in section 66)? Also, the
Evidence Code does not limit evidence of such disposition evidence to reputation evidence. Section 20 allows evidence of a trait of a person's character
to be given in the form of opinion, reputation, or "evidence of specific instances of conduct."
There is also some authority for allowing evidence of the violent disposition of the victim in homicide cases. In The King v. Drouin,113 the accused
was acquitted of the murder of his father. Evidence, known to the accused,
tending to show that the deceased had beaten members of his family and
endangered their lives on several occasions, was admitted. Evidence was also
admitted to show that the reputation of the deceased in regard to members
of his family was that of a cruel and violent man. In The King v. Martha
Scott," 4 on a charge of murder and a defence of self-defence, evidence was
allowed as to "the violence of the temper" of the deceased and of various
assaults by him upon the accused.
The proposed Evidence Code makes no specific reference to the character of the homicide victim other than the reference to all victims in section 17(1). However, such evidence would be admissible, subject to the
definition of "relevant evidence" in section 4, and the general power to exclude evidence in section 5.
These examples of character evidence of third parties deal with disposition and not credibility. Distinctions as to admissibility are made between
disposition and credibility. Similarly, it is suggested that a comparable distinction seems to be emerging in relation to psychiatric evidence. Admissibility appears to be much more difficult to achieve when such evidence goes
to credibility rather than disposition to show conduct on a particular occasion. For example, in R. v. French,"5 a psychiatrist testified on a voir dire
that a prosecution witness, to whom the accused allegedly confessed murder,
had a character disorder such that she was quite capable of lying under oath.
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's rejection of the evidence, holding that assessing credibility "is a matter peculiarly within the province of a
jury and it is only in unusual circumstances, which do not obtain here, that
that credibility can be attacked by the calling of expert medical evidence."'110
In R. v. Burkart and Sawatsky," 7 a conviction for rape was overturned on
the basis that evidence from a physician to the effect that the complainant
was likely to be a truthful person because of her low mental classification
should have been rejected. The court held that such evidence went only to
"1 (1910), 15 C.C.C. 205 (Que. K.B.). The note following the report on Drouin
cites other examples: R. v.Macarthy (1842), unreported, cited inRussell on Crimes
(8th ed. London: Stevens & Sons, Limited, 1923) at 1931, and R. v.Hopkins (1866), 10

Cox C.C. 229.
"4

(1910), 15 C.C.C. 442 (Ont. H.C.).

115 R. v.French, supra, note 68.

16 Id. at 211.
117 [19651 3 C.C.C. 210; 45 C.R. 383; 50 W.W.R. 515 (Sask. C.A.).

1978]

CharacterEvidence

the weight to be attributed to the complainant's testimony and, therefore, it
should have been rejected. A similar decision was reached by the Ontario
Court of Appeal in R. v. Kyselka."18
In relation to credibility, psychiatric evidence, like all evidence related
to credibility, is seen as raising unwanted collateral issues. It is suggested
that this same concern, in connection with credibility, explains the split decision in the Rosik"1 9 case and the rejection of the evidence in Phillion.2 0 The
evidence, although related to conduct or disposition, was heavily dependent
upon out-of-court statements by an accused who did not testify. Therefore,
these judgments express concern about self-serving statements being adduced
by an expert without the opportunity to cross-examine the accused who made
the statements.
However, some might argue that Toohey v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner'21 represents a decision wherein expert opinion as to the credibility
of a witness was allowed into evidence. In a trial for assault with intent to
rob, evidence by a doctor as to the victim's hysterical nature was first rejected; this ruling was upheld by the Court of Criminal Appeal. 22 The issue,
as stated by Lord Pearce, "was whether, as the prosecution alleged, the
episode created the hysteria, or whether, on the other hand, as the defence
alleged, the hysteria created the episode."' 23 The evidence went as much to
disposition as it did to the credibility of the witness. The House of Lords,
in ruling that the evidence was admissible, pointed out that the lower court
had failed to distinguish between evidence going to credibility and evidence
going to an issue.
The proposed Evidence Code separates provisions of character evidence
going to disposition from those dealing with character evidence in relation
to credibility. Any analysis of cases on character evidence would demonstrate
the wisdom of that separation.
6.

CharacterEvidence in Civil Cases
The general rule in civil cases is that character evidence cannot be used
to prove a particular act, or a failure to act, on a particular occasion. 124 In criminal cases, evidence of good or bad character gives rise to an inference that
a person of good or bad character would or would not commit a crime. But,
in civil cases, good character is said to be irrelevant to the question of
whether a person was negligent or did not fulfill a contract. An exception
exists in relation to similar fact evidence. It has been argued that the reason
118

(1962), 113 C.C.C. 103; [1962] O.W.N. 160; 37 C.R. 391 (Ont. C.A.).

119 Supra,note 82.
120 R. v. Phillion, supra,note 63.
'21 [1965] A.C. 595; [1965] 1 All E.R. 506; 49 Cr. App. R. 148.
122 [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1286; [1964] 3 All E.R. 582.
'23 Supra, note 121 at 604 (A.C.); 510 (All E.R.); 158 (Cr. App. R.).
'24 Attorney General v. Radloff (1854), 156 E.R. 366; Attorney General v.
Bowman (1781), 126 E.R. 1423; McArthur v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,
[1969] 2 O.R. 689 at 697; (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 477 at 485.
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given for the distinction between civil and criminal cases is illogical, and
that the real reason is the needs of trial administration.
If the logical relevance of the evidence were the test of admissibility, it would be
difficult to rationalize its exclusion in civil cases and its admission in criminal
cases. In tort actions such as assault, deceit and negligence, evidence of good
character on the part of the defendant would appear to be as relevant as the
evidence of good character of the accused in a criminal case.
While the courts appear to exclude character evidence in civil cases on the
basis of irrelevance, the real rationale is the policy to restrain civil proceedings
within manageable limits and to prevent unfairness to civil litigants, who cannot
be expected to be prepared to protect themselves against imputations which may
range over their whole career, without previous notice.125

However, the use of character evidence to diminish credibility is distinguishable from the use of character evidence to show conduct on a particular occasion. Evidence indicative of character can be led to show that a
particular witness suffers a bias against, or partiality for, a particular party,
or suffers a medical condition that affects his truthfulness. And credibility by
way of character evidence can come in the form of testimony relating to
general reputation for untruthfulness or cross-examination relating to prior
criminal convictions.128
The proposed Evidence Code has no specific provision dealing expressly
with character and disposition in relation to civil proceedings. Therefore, one
would assume that since such evidence is relevant, it is admissible even in
civil proceedings unless rendered inadmissible by the principles of the residual power of exclusion in section 5. This is confirmed by the Comments in
the Report on Evidence:
Although we may at times place too much importance upon a trait of a person's
character, there is no question that it is relevant in proving his conduct on a
specific occasion. Thus if an aggressive and a peaceable person were involved in
a physical altercation, we might, on the basis of their character traits, assume
that the aggressive person was more likely to have begun the fight. Consequently
in the absence of a specific rule excluding it, character evidence in many cases
would be admissible under section 4.
In most other cases character evidence as circumstantial evidence is of slight
probative value. Even when it is slightly probative it usually ought to be excluded
because of the possibility of prejudice, the consumption of time and the confusion
of the issues. But in some cases, for instance civil cases where there is an allegation of moral turpitude, the probative value of character evidence might outweigh
these dangers. These matters, however, require no special provision. They can
adequately be dealt with under the general rule (section 5) that such evidence
may be excluded.127

7.

Characteras a Fact in Issue

Character is in issue when it is one of the elements to be proved directly
in the proceedings. For example, the "dangerous offender" provisions of the
125 Sopinka and Lederman, The Law of Evidence in Civil Cases (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974) at 288.
126 The Ontario Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 151, s. 23.

12 7Supra, note 1 at 64-65.
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Criminal Code1 28 require proof of such character issues as, "a pattern of
repetitive behaviour," "a likelihood of his causing death or injury," "a pattern
of persistent aggressive behaviour," "his behaviour in the future is unlikely
to be inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint," and "failure in
the future to control his sexual impulses." Similarly, character may be proved
directly in civil proceedings. For example, character may be directly in issue
on liability or quantum of damages in actions for defamation, seduction or
indecent assault. The cases vary as to whether character may be proved by
specific acts or only by reputation. A preference is given to evidence of prior
convictions over other specific acts.u 9
The proposed Evidence Code deals expressly with character evidence
going to disposition and credibility, but not expressly with character evidence
when character is directly in issue. Strictly speaking, the topic is outside the
scope of this article, which is limited to those sections dealing with character
evidence as a variety of circumstantial evidence (i.e., character used to prove
some other issue indirectly, such as conduct on a particular occasion, rather
than character evidence used directly in proof of an issue as to character
per se).
8.

Similar Fact Evidence
The proposed Evidence Code does expressly deal with similar fact evidence:
18. Nothing in section 17 prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong or other act when relevant to prove some fact other than
his disposition to commit such act, such as evidence to prove absence of mistake or
accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity.

Wisely, the Evidence Code does not try to codify all of the many rules, exceptions, inconsistencies and peculiarities of this very difficult area of law.
Rather, by this section, it preserves the mechanism of similar fact evidence
as a mode of proof and leaves the further development of refinements and
guidelines to case law. Section 18 invites recourse to the previous law for
guidance.
Similar fact evidence is admissible in both civil and criminal cases to
prove intent by showing system, guilty knowledge, design or malice, or by
rebutting a defence of innocent or lawful purpose, mistake or accident. It is
also used to show identity or the actus reus of a crime. It is used to prove
the state or condition of places or things in connection with previous accidents, to prove ownership, agency and business practice. The latter are more
in the nature of habit than character; however, Canadian law treats habit as
a variety of similar fact evidence.' 30
Much difficulty in analysis and application is caused by maintaining
12 8 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, ss. 687-695.1, as enacted by the Criminal Law Amendment
Act, 1977 (1976-77, c. 53, s.14).
129 Goody v. Odhams Press Ltd., [1967] 1 Q.B. 333; Jorgensen v. New Zealand
Newspapers Ltd., [1974] 2 N.Z.L.R. 45; and, cf. PlatoFilms Ltd. v. Speidel, [1961] A.C.
1090; [1961] 1 All E.R. 876.
13oSupra, note 7 and accompanying text.
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these categories, rather than formulating rules which demonstrate the principles shared in common by all varieties of similar fact evidence. This was
the approach towards simplification taken by the House of Lords in D.P.P.
v. Boardman;131 it also seems to have been the approach used by the drafters
of section 18.
C.

PREVENTIVE ACTIONS
The topic of preventive actions concerns the admissibility of evidence
with respect to subsequent remedial measures, liability insurance and the
payment of medical and similar expenses. Because of certain policy considerations, special rules have been created to govern the use of these types of evidence. Remedial measures and the payment of expenses are to be encouraged
and may be taken or made for reasons other than awareness of culpable conduct or negligence; therefore, the law sanctions the use of such evidence.
Furthermore, proof of insurance presents the potential danger of an unwarranted confusion of the issues of liability to pay with the ability to pay.
In regard to subsequent remedial measures, the theme of the present case
law is that a sensible person takes precautions to prevent an accident from happening again. Therefore, it has been held that either such evidence, although
admissible, is not evidence of an admission of negligence when standing
alone, 8 2 or alternatively, such evidence is completely inadmissible as evidence
of negligence. 3 However, it may afford evidence on other issues, such as
whether the object or situation remedied was a source of danger or in a state
8 4
of disrepair.
The proposed Evidence Code would exclude evidence of subsequent
remedial measures except on one narrow issue:
Section 21: Evidence of measures taken after an event, which if taken previously
would have made the event less likely to occur, is inadmissible to prove negligence
or culpable conduct in connection with the event, except when offered to rebut
an allegation regarding the feasibility of precautionary measures.

This provision is very similar to the U.S. Federal Rule 407:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeached.

The first branch, or exclusionary branch, of section 21 can be justified

as encouraging the provision of remedies and as ruling inadmissible evidence
which is often equally consistent with accident and contributory negligence as
with negligence or an admission of negligence. The second branch of the rule
181 [1973] 3 W.L.R. 673.
132 CanadianPacific Railway Co. v. City of Calgary (1966), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 642;
58 W.W.R. 124 (Alta. C.A.).
8
' - MacKay v. City of Saskatoon (1960), 26 D.L.R. (2d) 506 (Sask. C.A.).
184 Peddle v. Sydney, [1939] 3 D.L.R. 33 (N.S.S.C.).
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seems to allow remedial measures as proof of negligence where the feasibility
of precautions is raised. Therefore, the rule, taken as a whole, does not exclude
remedial measures adduced in proof of issues other than negligence and culpable conduct. There is no statement to that effect as in Rule 407. But, there
does not need to be, for the Evidence Code as a true code excludes all other
stating
sources of the law as authoritative and fills the space thus vacated 8by
5
that all evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided by statute.'
Section 22 of the proposed Evidence Code deals with liability insurance
as follows:
Section 22: Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is
inadmissible as tending to prove negligence or other wrong-doing unless the
probative value of such evidence substantially outweighs the danger of undue
prejudice.

The Supreme Court has held that where something occurs during the course
of the trial from which the jury may reasonably infer that the defendant is
insured, the services of that particular jury should be dispensed with; that
the trial judge should afford counsel a full opportunity of making submissions before deciding what course should then be followed; and, that having
done so, it is for the trial judge to decide whether to continue the trial himself without a jury or to direct that the case should proceed before another
jury. 13 Evidence of insurance is considered to be irrelevant. It is argued
that one who is insured against negligent conduct is not, therefore, less careful than he would otherwise be or than others who are not insured. Such
evidence is also considered very prejudicial; the argument being that those
who are known to be able to assume the loss are more likely to be found
liable.
However, the commentary relating to section 22137 argues that evidence
of insurance might be highly probative. Therefore, the section provides the
trial judge with a discretion to admit such evidence where its probative value
substantially outweighs the danger of undue prejudice. The example given in
support of this rule is of an allegation that a defendant wilfully destroyed his
property to realize the insurance monies. This is an example of the second
branch of the phrase, "to prove negligence or other wrongdoing." But section
22 would allow the trial judge to admit evidence of insurance on the question
of negligence if he thought such evidence was of sufficient probative value to
outweigh the potential prejudice. Or perhaps it is intended that the "discretion" apply only to questions of "other wrongdoing." 138
135 Supra, note 1, section 4(1).
188 Bowhey v. Theakston, [1951] S.C.R. 679; [1951] 4 D.L.R. 150 (S.C.C.). How-

ever, if the jury itself raises the matter of insurance, judgment will not be set aside; see
Dickison v. Montgomery, [1960] O.R. 544 (Ont. C.A.).
137 Supra, note 1 at 67.
138 It is doubtful that section 22 does incorporate a true discretion as the commentary states, i.e., a point of decision left to the opinion of the trial judge which
cannot be appealed, which means that the appeal court cannot substitute its decision
or opinions for that of the trial judge, e.g., an assessment of the credibility of witnesses.

Given the present case law on the powers of appeal courts, it is more likely that they

would feel that, in regard to section 22, they are in as good a position to determine
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Rule 411 of the U.S. Federal Rules does not leave to the judge any
discretion whether evidence of insurance should be admitted on issues of negligence or other wrong-doing. The rule states:
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability
when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control,

or bias or prejudice of a witness.
Section 54 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 1953, and Rule 411 of the Draft
Vermont Rules of Evidence and of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 1974
are identical to this provision. Section 1155 of the California Evidence Code
is substantially the same as the first sentence of Rule 411. Some argue that
juries assume defendants are insured; therefore, if it were admitted, such evidence would not be creating a prejudice which would not otherwise be there.
Since there may be factual situations where such evidence may be highly
probative, the rules should allow for its admission in such cases. Section 22
would give effect to such an argument. However, at present, both Canadian
case law and American codifications are more absolute than section 22 in
excluding all evidence of insurance.
These positions are reversed in regard to evidence of payment of medical and similar expenses. The leading decisions say that such payments are
not necessarily an admission of liability; it depends on the circumstances.13 0
Section 23 of the Evidence Code, however, would allow no weighing of circumstances, but rather, would bar such evidence on issues of liability absolutely.
Evidence that a person has furnished or offered or promised to pay medical,
hospital or similar expenses occasioned by an injury is inadmissible to prove
liability for the injury.

This provision closely resembles the U.S. Federal Rule 411, which in turn,
has a very similar counterpart in each of the other more noteworthy American
40
codifications.
Payment, or offers of payment, if made by a party to the proceeding,
would not be rendered inadmissible by the rule against hearsay because it

when prejudice is too great for probative value as the trial judge, just as they are prepared to hold that they can draw inferences from undisputed facts just as well as the
trial judge. See Benmax v. Austin Motor Co., Ltd., [1955] A.C. 370; [1955] 1 All E.R.
326 (H.L.); Workmen's Compensation Board v. Greer, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 347; 42 D.L.R.
(3d) 595. Appeal courts are quite used to reversing trial judges on issues of prejudice
versus probative value; for example, rulings on similar fact evidence; rulings under the
"no substantial wrong" provisions of the Criminal Code, section 613 (1) (b) (iii).
139 Walmsley v. Humenick, [1954] 2 D.L.R. 232 (B.C.S.C.); Kowal v. New York
Central Railroad Co., [1934] S.C.R. 214; [1934] 4 D.L.R. 440. In Walmsley, Clyne J.
stated at 235 (D.L.R.) that, "Under certain conditions payments may constitute an
admission of liability but it is necessary to consider the circumstances."
140 See Rule 409 in the Uniform Rules of Evidence 1974, supra, note 15; Section
1152(a) of the California Evidence Code, supra,note 3; Rule 409 of the Draft Vermont
Rules of Evidence, supra, note 11; Rule 52 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence 1953,
supra, note 4.
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would fall within the well-recognized exception as to admissions by a partylitigant. Conduct, however, can be hearsay, because inferences can be drawn
from it, so that actions speak as loudly as words. Similarly conduct, such as
the making of a payment or the offering of payment, can be taken as an
admission by a party-litigant, even though at the time of the admission, there
was no litigation and no dispute. But, although such payment or offer would
be saved from the hearsay rule by this exception, it might be ruled inadmissible under the present case law if the judge's examination of the motivating
factors underlying the payment or offer shows that no acknowledgment of
liability was intended. However, if the payment or offer was accompanied by
a statement acknowledging liability, that separate statement would not be
caught by a rule such as section 23, and would be admissible as an admission by a party-litigant. Also, this statement would show that the payment or offer was, in effect, an acknowledgment of liability. However, although section 23 would bar the payment or offer, it would not affect the
admissibility of the separate statement. Most likely the statement would reveal the fact of the offer. Therefore, section 23 would have to be extended
beyond its literal meaning so as to be interpreted as barring the statement
as well, in order to maintain the integrity of the rule. Should the plaintiff be
barred from using such cogent evidence? It appears that such payments or
offers which show an acceptance of liability were never intended to be caught
by section 23. The commentary to section 23 in the Report on Evidence
speaks of people not giving assistance for "fear that such conduct may later
be regarded as an admission of liability."'141 An express or implied acknowledgment of liability does not show fear that such will be taken as an admission of such. This example may lead one to suspect that there may be greater
wisdom in dealing with such evidence of payments and offers by an examination of motivating factors and surrounding circumstances than by an absolute
bar to admissibility in the form of a rule such as section 23. But this analysis
considers only the need for relevant evidence and the quality of the evidence.
There are other considerations.
Why would the American codifiers uniformly recommend provisions
which are similar to section 23? The answer does not lie within the most
frequent sources of the rules of evidence-reliability of the evidence; necessity due to the unavailability of other evidence; the needs of efficient trial
administration; the principles of the adversarial process. Rather, it lies within
another fundamental principle which is a less frequent source of rules of
evidence--exclusion for purposes of policies which are extrinsic to the needs
of the trial process. The present rule, which allows consideration of surrounding circumstances in determining if payments and offers should be
used in proof of liability as an admission, recognizes that payments and
offers made for humanitarian reasons should be encouraged so as to reduce
the need for litigation. This public interest could be better served by a policy
which bars such evidence entirely so as to completely remove any fear that
1
14
The whole explanatory commentary to section 23 is very short; supra, note 1 at

67 states: "People should not be discouraged from assisting others involved in an accident by fear that such conduct may later be regarded as an admission of liability. This
section renders the offer of payment of medical expenses inadmissible to prove liability."
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such conduct will be used in proof of liability. In theory, at least, a potential
plaintiff will be compensated for the loss of what might be taken as very
probative evidence by an increased possibility that the potential defendant
will make payment.
Therefore, taking sections 21, 22, and 23 together, the proposed Evidence Code would bar evidence of efforts to compensate for damage or to
set things aright, except in certain limited situations. These three rules as to
remedial measures, liability insurance and payment of expenses, draw no
distinction between time periods before and after the dispute arises. All apply
after the event, giving rise to a question of liability without distinction as to
whether the parties are in agreement or in dispute. The next three rules deal
with similar matters occuring after a dispute has arisen or litigation has commenced. Although they also may involve preventive actions, they are more
appropriately placed under the heading "Compromises."
D.

COMPROMISES
Compromises are also a variety of circumstantial evidence from which
one can infer an acknowledgment of liability. But despite their probative
value, similar policy principles have led to rules limiting use of discussions or
conduct as part of attempts at settlement by negotiation. If the disputants
know that their statements and writings in pursuit of settlement cannot be
used as evidence in proof of liability or guilt, they will be encouraged to
settle civil and criminal matters and thus avoid litigation. If the policy involves a sound principle, one might expect to find rules barring use of communications and actions to seek settlement of civil liability, barring withdrawn
guilty pleas and offers to plead guilty, and barring use against the accused of
statements by which the accused or his counsel are connected with attempted
settlements of criminal charges or complaints.
At present, statements made during negotiations in search of settlement
are subject to the "without prejudice" rule which prevents the contents of
the statement being put into evidence without the consent of both parties.
When communications are understood as being "without prejudice," a situation of joint privilege arises. The public interest that disputes be settled and
litigation be reduced to a minimum is the basis of the rule-a policy very
similar to one considered in the previous portion of this article, that compensation for expenses due to injury and the taking of remedial measures be
encouraged. Also, offers of settlement and the surrounding negotiations often
arise simply from a desire to avoid litigation and not a belief in liability or
in the weakness of one's defences. However, threats of perjury and of bribery
of witnesses made during negotiations will not be protected by the privilege
as to "without prejudice" discussions and can be
admitted as circumstantial
142
evidence of one's belief that his defences are bad.
Under section 24 of the proposed Evidence Code there would be similar
protection for such privileged statements and the practice of specifically designating communications in the course of compromise negotiations "without
142

Greenwood v. Fitts (1961), 29 D.L.R. (2d) 260 (B.C.C.A.).
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prejudice" to protect against their being misunderstood or treated as admissions, would be unnecessary:
24. Evidence of attempts to compromise a disputed claim or of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is inadmissible to prove liability for, or invalidity of the claim or its amount, but nothing in this section prevents the use
of such evidence for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a
witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct
a criminal investigation or prosecution.

The provision in the latter part of section 24 comes from the U.S. Federal
Rule 408.143 That rule is similar, but provides, in addition, that evidence
otherwise discoverable is not inadmissible merely because it had been presented during compromise negotiations. The present case law contains a similar rule that evidence of facts discovered during negotiations is not inadmissible. Such a rule prevents the use of negotiations as a device for rendering
certain items inadmissible. Therefore, the privilege renders inadmissible the
fact of negotiation and attempted compromise, but relevant information obtained during the course of negotiations may be proved.
The payment into court in satisfaction of a claim or cause of action
would come within section 24. Presently, similar protection against evidence
of such payments being used as an admission of the cause of action is given
by rules of practice and procedure. 144
Section 25 renders inadmissible in proof of guilt pleas of guilty which are
later withdrawn, and offers to plead guilty:
25. Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or of an offer to plead guilty to a
crime, or of statements made in connection with any such plea or offer, are
inadmissible against the person who made the plea or offer for the purpose of
determining guilt.

At present, withdrawn pleas of guilty are inadmissible in proof of guilt at the
trial which follows from the withdrawal of the plea of guilty. 145 But where a
plea of guilty is declared to be illegal, as distinguished from being allowed to
be withdrawn as an exercise of judicial discretion, evidence of the guilty plea
may be adduced at the subsequent trial. 146 The accused has been allowed to
143 Similar rules can be found in section 52 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
1953, supra, note 4; Section 1154 of the California Evidence Code, supra, note 3; and
Rule 408 of the Draft Vermont Rules of Evidence, supra, note 11.
144 For example, Rule 307 of the Ontario Rules of Practice, James J. Carthy &
W. A. Derry Millar (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1977) states: "Payment of money
into court shall not, unless expressly so stated, be deemed an admission of the cause
of action in respect of which it is paid." And, Rule 317 prohibits reference to payments
into court in the pleadings and prohibits communication of that fact being made to
the judge or jury until all questions of liability and damages have been decided.
145 Thibodeau v. The Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 646; 21 C.R. 265. Cartwright J., in
delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, held that when the plea of
guilty was permitted to be withdrawn, for all purposes it was as though it had never
been made, and therefore, evidence that it had been made was inadmissible.
140 R. v. Dietrich, supra, note 85. Gale CJ.O., delivering the judgment of the court
stated at 30 (C.R.N.S.); 56 (C.C.C.); 732-33 (O.R.) that: "The cases referred to other
than Thibodeau establish that testimony or statements of an accused on a previous trial
or occasion may be treated as an admission at a subsequent trial for the same offence.
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change his plea to one of not guilty where he satisfies the court that he did
not understand the legal consequences of a guilty plea, 147 where he pleaded
guilty under the influence of drugs, 148 or that the guilty plea was entered without proper understanding of the charge, where the plea was induced by
49
threats or by an improper bargain or where a question of law is involved,1
or where the guilty plea was induced by the misrepresentations of his own
solicitor..' ° Therefore, one can say that it is very clearly established in the
present case law that a change of plea is not as a matter of right available to
the accused, but rather requires an exercise of discretion by the trial judge
and the exercise of that discretion, if judicially exercised, will not be lightly
interfered with.' 5 '
Section 25 does not contain any reference to this discretion nor to the
distinction between pleas allowed to be withdrawn and those nullified by a
collateral quashing of a conviction on grounds other than the accused's
ability to enter or understand a plea of guilty. Section 25 speaks simply of
"a plea of guilty later withdrawn." However, these topics are usually considered matters of criminal procedure, therefore, one would not expect to
find them in a statute on evidence.
Turning from the plea of guilty to the offer to plead guilty, section 25
would likely be interpreted as changing the law, if it were enacted. A distinction has been drawn in the case law between plea discussions or plea bargaining, and mere offers to plead guilty. It has been held that an offer to plead
guilty made to a police officer by the accused, which could not be said to
be part of negotiations to plead guilty, was simply a voluntary statement
made by the accused, and therefore, could be adduced by the prosecution at
It is difficult to see why a plea given at an abortive trial of this type should stand in any
different position.... Crown counsel relied upon the confessions made by the accused
to the police and others and the fact that, having had the advice of his counsel, the
accused, as planned entered the plea of guilty. We think Crown counsel was entitled
to do so in an attempt to show consistent conduct on the part of the accused."
In Dietrich, the first conviction was quashed, ((1968), 3 C.R.N.S. 361 (Ont.
C.A.)), because it was held that at that time, a trial judge had no jurisdiction to accept
a plea of guilty of non-capital murder on an indictment for capital murder. For an
analysis of the distinction between the Thibodeau and Dietrich cases, see Stenning,
Admissibility of Guilty Pleas and Psychiatric Evidence of Capacity for Yeracity (1970),
11 C.R.N.S. 43.
147R. v. Corcoran (1967), 2 C.R.N.S. 160 (N.S. Cty. Ct.); Adgey v. The Queen
(1973), 23 C.R.N.S. 299; 13 C.C.C. (2d) 177 (S.C.C.).
148R. v. Kavanagh, [1956] O.W.N. 69; 22 C.R. 396; 114 C.C.C. 378 (Ont. C.A.).
149 Dunn v. The King, [1944] 4 D.L.R. 414; 82 C.C.C. 184 (P.E.I.S.C.); cf. R. v.
Niman (1975), 31 C.R.N.S. 51 (Ont. Prov. Ct.); Upton v. Brown (1912), 21 C.C.C.
190 (Alta. Dist. Ct.).
5oR. v. Behr, [1967] 2 O.R. 622; [1968] 2 C.C.C. 151 (Ont. C.A.).
151Adgey v. The Queen, supra, note 147. Surprisingly, the commentary to section
25 speaks of a "right to have a plea withdrawn": "Indeed the right to have a plea withdrawn would be illusory if it could be used against the accused at a subsequent trial."
Supra,note 1 at 68.
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the trial which followed.152 In contrast, section 25 would render such statements inadmissible for purposes of determining guilt (as distinguished from
use in regard to credibility)

.53

Rule 410 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence provides similar protection in regard to offers and withdrawn pleas of guilty. But the protection
is expressly extended to civil proceedings as well, and not merely to purposes "of determining guilt" as in section 25. It extends its protection to
attacks on credibility. But, Rule 410 states that exclusion of offers and
withdrawn pleas do not extend to in-court statements in connection with
such offers or withdrawn pleas, "where offered for impeachment purposes."
Section 1153 of the California Evidence Code is not so limited, in that evidence of withdrawn guilty pleas and of offers is inadmissible for all purposes
"inany proceeding of any nature." Rule 410 of the Draft Vermont Rules is
identical to Federal Rule 410. The Reporter's Notes to the Draft Vermont
Rules point out that, "the rule is silent on the effect of the collateral overturning of a judgment based on a plea of guilty." As pointed out above, section 25 is silent on guilty pleas nullified by convictions quashed, as distinguished from guilty pleas withdrawn. 154 The Notes continue: "In such a case,
the plea should be treated as withdrawn."'155 This view has its supporters
in Canada who criticize the distinction made in the Canadian cases between
the "procedural and substantive aspects of legal invalidity" of guilty pleas;
the former being those aspects which lead to the nullifying of guilty pleas,
the latter being those which proceed from the withdrawing of guilty pleas.15
The purpose of rules such as those in section 25 and Rule 410 is to
promote the disposition of criminal matters by settlement and compromise.
Therefore, the protection by way of an exclusionary rule should extend to
civil as well as criminal proceedings. However, in Canadian law, this raises
152 R. v. Draskovic (1972), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 186 (Ont. C.A.). The accused, while

in the prisoner's dock, prior to the opening of court, called a police officer over and
offered to plead guilty to five of several charges if a charge of armed robbery were
dropped.
153 Quite possibly, section 25 might not bar use of an offer to plead guilty in crossexamination for purposes of attacking credibility. Section 25 speaks of such offers being
"inadmissible against the person who made them," which is open to the interpretation
that section 25 deals only with such evidence being used in proof of issues of guilt as
distinguished from credibility, particularly having regard to the fact that section 25 is in
a portion of the Evidence Code dealing with circumstantial evidence in proof of conduct.
However, section 64(2), which appears under the heading "credibility" provides that,

"No evidence of the accused's character, including evidence that he has been convicted

of a crime, is admissible for the sole purpose of attacking his credibility as a witness,
unless he has first introduced evidence admissible solely for the purpose of supporting
his credibility." An offer to plead guilty to a charge of criminal conduct is easily interpreted as being "evidence of the accused's character." But even so, such offer would be
conditionally admissible on credibility, dependent upon the accused's adducing evidence
in support of his credibility.
154 See supra,notes 145 and 146 and accompanying text.
155 See the Tentative Draft Evidence Vermont Rules of Evidence, supra, note 11 at

59.
IN0 The case law is discussed at supra, notes 145 and 146. The phrase comes from
an annotation by Stenning, supra, note 146.
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that uncertainty which surrounds an attempt by a federal statute to exclude
matters connected with federal legislative jurisdiction from proceedings governed by a provincial evidence act.
The last section in the portion of the proposed Evidence Code dealing
with exclusion of certain circumstantial evidence, section 26, carries the marginal note "Pre-Trial Settlement of Criminal Complaint."
A statement made in the course of an attempt to reach a pre-trial settlement of a
criminal complaint is inadmissible against the accused in a criminal proceeding
in which the accused is charged with having committed an act constituting the
subject matter of the attempted settlement.

Section 26 would provide protection against use of a broader field of statements than those covered in section 25 which excludes statements connected
with withdrawn pleas of guilty and offers to plead guilty. The key words distinguishing section 26 from section 25 are "pre-trial settlement," and "criminal complaint," which are broad enough to cover statements made at a time
before a charge is laid and all statements connected with attempts to settle
criminal matters, as long as such statements are made before trial. Such
statements need not concern potential guilty pleas or offers of such. There15 7
fore, section 26 would apply to attempts to negotiate diversion agreements.
In order for diversion to be a successful concept in practice, a provision
such as section 26 would have to operate in law or administrative practice.
The essential purpose of diversion is to provide a solution to the problem
that too many minor social problems are submitted to the criminal justice
system for resolution instead of to social agencies.
There is no rule comparable to section 26 in the existing law, although
a residual discretion in the trial judge to exclude evidence which is thought
to operate unfairly against the accused might be applied to the same effect l us
However, in Canada, that residual discretion no longer has such scope160 But
the present case law does offer more promise for establishing a more specific
rule in relation to a principle or discretion which would allow the trial judge

157 Diversion can be defined as a process whereby other social or legal means are
used as alternatives to the criminal court process. Diversion is an alternative to trial.

It can take the form of a negotiated settlement for restitution or reconciliation between
the person suspected of having committed an offence and the victim, an agreement to
carry out some community service, or to undertake treatment, training or counselling,
or perhaps simply to make an apology. The purpose is to avoid the laying of charges
or to secure the withdrawal of charges by providing an acceptable alternative to prosecu-

tion of less serious criminal matters. For a very sound analysis of the diversion concept
see the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper No. 7, Diversion (Ottawa:
Ministry of Justice, 1974) and the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Our Criminal
Law (Ottawa: Ministry of Justice, 1973).
158 Per Lord Goddard in Kuruma v. The Queen, [1955] A.C. 197 at 204; Per Lord
Parker CJ. in Callisv. Gunn, [1964] 1 Q.B. 495 at 501.
159 The Queen v. Wray, supra, note 42. Martland J., in delivering the judgment of
the majority stated at 17 (C.C.C.); 690 (D.L.R.); 293 (S.C.R.): "It is only the allowance of evidence gravely prejudicial to the accused, the admissibility of which is tenuous,
and whose probative force in relation to the main issue before the court is trifling, which
can be said to operate unfairly."
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to exclude confidential communications.

60

Attempts at pre-trial settlement

could satisfy the elements of such a rule of privilege.

E.

CONCLUSION

To place the rules that come under the heading "exclusion of certain
circumstantial evidence" in statutory form is desirable. The rules as to
character and disposition concern a difficult area of the law, an area which is
not well understood. The greatest advantage provided by this portion of
the proposed Evidence Code (sections 17 to 20 inclusive), is the separation
of character evidence going to conduct or disposition in proof of conduct
on a particular occasion, from character evidence going to credibility. The
provisions dealing with preventive actions and compromises are, for the most
part, the present law. They are reasonably clear and should cause no more
difficulty in interpretation than the comparable rules in the existing case law,
but with the advantage that they are more accessable. The one exception to
this conclusion that sections 17 to 26 of the Evidence Code are workable and
should be put in statutory form, is section 20, and the rule that character
evidence going to disposition may be received in the form of specific instances of conduct. That provision should make trial administration and the
control of time consumption much more difficult. Theoretically, allowing all
witnesses to give character evidence in the form of individual opinion would
seem to present the same threat. But in actual practice, character witnesses
do that frequently, although such character evidence in general is infrequent.
Therefore, the same objection is not made in regard to that loosening of the
rules as to character evidence as is made in regard to evidence of specific
instances of conduct in proof of a trait of character.

10See Slavutych v. Baker, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 254; 38 C.R.N.S. 306; A.G. v.
Mulholland and Foster, [1963] 2 Q.B. 477.

